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Today’s global community needs a better answer to the problem of jihadist 
violence. The threat continues to change, which often leaves states unprepared for the next 
violent event. This thesis illuminates one part of the discussion by addressing the following 
question: Why did France face an increased terror threat in 2012, when 10 years prior to 
this, it was widely praised for its effective counterterrorism efforts? This work recognizes 
a new version of global Salafist jihad, which manifests in a decentralized, transnational 
movement and uses social media to perpetuate a narrative of civilizational conflict. Then, 
an analysis of the dynamics of state-societal interaction in France prior to 2012 is used to 
identify three undercurrents that new terrorism could leverage. First, a review of the history 
of French Muslim political activism reveals that their success in winning concessions from 
the state is limited. Second, an increasing number of second-generation Muslim youth are 
unable to identify with either Eastern or Western culture. Third, France’s record of 
exceptionally Westernized Muslim sentiment likely antagonizes jihadist ideologues. By 
this framework, jihadists are motivated to recruit wayward youth with a narrative of 
renewed identity and purpose in jihad. 
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On September 11, 2001, the world watched as the United States reeled from 
terrorist attacks previously unimaginable to the average observer. The perpetrators and 
motivations behind the violence were not new developments, but the scope and scale of 
the attacks was a shocking revolution. France watched with sympathy and horror, yet it 
continued to experience relative security within “the Hexagon” of French sovereign 
territory.1 By March of 2004, Spain experienced similar throes of terrorism after its public 
train system suffered an attack with comparable coordinated and calculated violence. 
Again, France peered across the border in surprise and solidarity with its European 
neighbor, but the francophone nation continued experience public safety. In July 2005, 
little more than a year following the attacks in Madrid, London fell victim to its own 
horrifying public transportation massacre at the hands of al-Qaeda backed militants. While 
France experienced social rioting in the summer of 2005, it still remained free from the 
kind of transnational terrorism that, by that time, was a reality among many Western states. 
It was not until January 2012, more than 10 years after global jihad had gone public, that 
France experienced its first taste of things to come—a bitter pill of repeated jihadi-inspired 
violence, which rocked French society to its core.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses the question why is it that France, which 10 years ago was 
widely praised for the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts, is today facing a greatly 
increased terror threat? While France’s approach to counterterrorism differs from that of 
its European neighbors, it had nonetheless been successful in ensuring public safety against 
terrorism through the first decade of the 21st century. Beginning in 2012, however, France 
began experiencing a recurrence of Islamist terrorism with little pattern or warning; this 
peaked in the spectacular Paris attacks in November 2015. The goal of this thesis is to gain 
an understanding of how France, an advanced democracy, could rather suddenly find itself 
                                                 
1 “The Hexagon” (l’Hexagone) is a colloquial term for the physically bounded territory of France itself 
as its international borders create roughly the shape of a hexagon.  
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the target of multiple discrete jihadist attacks. Are French counterterror agencies or 
elements in French government or society at fault or has there been a change in the nature 
of the threat itself? More broadly, what does the contemporary French experience with 
jihadism tell us about the terrorist threat today? Can any conclusions have relevance outside 
of France? Understanding the threat is of utmost importance to undertaking any 
comparative analysis within French society, yet debate surrounds the concept coined “new 
terrorism” in contemporary scholarship. This thesis provides a standpoint in the debate as 
a reference for its application to France’s perplexing resurgence of religiously inspired 
terrorism. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Although the leading contemporary terrorist groups, al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), continue to lose influence, leadership, and operating space, their 
call for global jihad continues. As events in France have indicted, jihadists are answering 
the call, yet they carry out their work in a way that seems shockingly indiscriminate to 
observers worldwide. The targeted state governments have urgently taken to diagnosing 
the complexity and pervasiveness of the problem in order to provide the public security, 
which is of paramount importance in advanced democracies. In light of environmental 
developments, many terrorism professionals and scholars have offered fresh analysis and 
corrective actions that might stem future movement toward radicalization within at-risk 
populations. 
However, a quandary has developed with regard to the application of today’s 
counterterrorist policy. If we claim to understand the problem and have applied concerted 
solutions as proposed by academics and pundits, why do we continue to see both violent 
Islamist terrorism and the widespread sentiment supporting such action? While citizens of 
predominately Muslim countries have a growing concern about organized Islamic 
extremist groups, polls show that a significant minority—and in some cases a majority—
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believe that suicide bombing can be justified as a defense of Islam.2 Even more perplexing 
to the question is the precedent throughout history whereby socioeconomic drivers of 
radicalization foment class struggle and internal revolutions but do not result in such 
widespread transnational upheaval and violence. 
The global threat of “leaderless jihad” has developed faster than its Western targets 
have been able to counter it. This is not surprising given the now traditionally slow pace of 
the West in matching regional cultural wisdom with foreign and domestic policy. For 
almost a decade, a lack of cultural understanding and ignorance of the local rules at play 
on the ground in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom have cost the 
United States and its allies dearly in terms of human, material, and strategic losses. A 
similar program may be replaying in France as law enforcement and the intelligence 
community take a long-established and aggressive approach to this new threat. Even in the 
many instances where authorities have discovered and thwarted terrorist plots, local 
governments and communities had already missed opportunities to prevent radical 
sentiment from fomenting in the hearts and minds of the terrorists. This begs the question 
of where extremism begins, and more pragmatically, at what point can a state and society—
such as France—successfully intercept that trend? 
Analysis of the primary research question can contribute to our understanding of 
terrorism and counterterrorism in three areas. The initial contribution of this thesis is in 
consolidating the discussion on what makes new terrorism new. We must thoroughly 
understand the threat in its historical context as well as its contemporary nuance to evaluate 
its role in the French experience. With regard to France-specifically, the second 
contribution is in understanding the intricate relationship between state institutions, the 
domestic community, and security organizations. Given France’s now inconsistent record 
in counterterrorism, this thesis seeks to provide a holistic viewpoint of how successful 
French policies and programs are in understanding and addressing the contemporary 
threats. Finally, armed with information on how France has either facilitated or suppressed 
                                                 
2 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East,” Pew Research Center’s Global 
Attitudes Project (blog), July 1, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-
extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/.   
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terror, the conclusions of this thesis regarding the best way forward may help policy makers 
more effectively tailor calls for change and adaptation within France and potentially 
worldwide.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The prevailing sentiment in new terrorism theory centers on the Western 
characterization of leaderless jihad and the broad influence of globalization on how 
Islamist extremists carry it out. There is disagreement among scholars as to whether they 
should consider the phenomenon of low-tech, discrete attacks a major evolutionary step or 
simply a variation on past practices. In either case, there are environmental factors that are 
new to the 21st century—particularly the increased flow of information via social media—
that could easily redefine the nature of the threat. Categorizing generational differences in 
terrorism is not a fresh endeavor. For example, in 2002, David Rapoport classified four 
“waves” over the span of approximately 150 years from anarchists to anti-colonialists, 
again to left-wing terrorists, then finally to religiously inspired attackers.3  
Subsequently, Glenn Robinson has s subdivided the latest, religious wave into four 
separate waves of global jihad.4 The first wave emerged after the Soviet Union’s invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979 as a call to Muslims worldwide to protect Muslim lands from infidel 
occupiers. The second wave coalesced under Osama Bin Laden and sought to attack “far 
enemy” Western targets that buoyed supposed apostate regimes in the Muslim world. The 
third wave began after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and was led by several ideologues 
that sought the formation of a caliphate in the Levant.  
Robinson describes the fourth and current wave of global jihad as one of “personal 
jihad,” intended to “Keep hope alive!” in the midst of declining groups, cells, and a 
caliphate.5 Like other scholars, Robinson expects this wave to persistently manifest as a 
“networked, decentralized, small-scale [threat, with its] violence attached to media 
                                                 
3 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics: The 
Journal of Generative Anthropology VIII, no. 1 (2002), http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/.   
4 Glenn E. Robinson, “The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979–2017,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 3 
(September 2017): 72, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12287.   
5 Robinson, “The Four Waves of Global Jihad,” 72.  
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campaigns.”6 The threats that manifested within France may be an example of a muddied 
transition from the third to fourth waves of global jihad. 
1. Two Sides in the Hexagon 
The debate in France surrounding the questions of what caused religiously inspired 
terrorism to return so pervasively has been underway for several years. Gilles Kepel and 
Oliver Roy are at the forefront of a heated discussion regarding Islamist violence in the 
Hexagon, and provide opposing perspectives on radical motivation and the goals of violent 
extremists. To put it simply, Kepel espouses the concept of radicalized Islam while Roy 
instead sees the phenomenon as an Islamization of radicalism. The differences between 
their scholarly theories not only delineate an academic disagreement but also inadvertently 
codify camps of public sentiment over the issue.7 The accompanying political division 
among the populace remains a sticking point in the ability of government and social groups 
to advance understanding and resolution of potential contributing factors to terrorism in 
France.  
Roy makes the argument that French terrorists do not first radicalize through 
religion before becoming violent.8 On the contrary, he argues, they choose to be radicals 
only because it appeals to them and not because of any manipulation or familial cultural 
influence.9 He builds a description of who the new radicals are in France, why and how 
they use Islam for violent revolt, and when and where these jihadists embrace religion. 
Roy’s core belief is that the new French terrorists are a nihilistic bunch that hate all of 
society and that have a penchant for death that includes even themselves.10 This movement 
emerges largely from the French youth, potentially second or third generation immigrants 
                                                 
6 Robinson, “The Four Waves of Global Jihad,” 72.  
7 Adam Nossiter, “‘That Ignoramus’: 2 French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals,” New 
York Times, July 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/europe/france-radical-islam.html, 
1.  
8 Olivier Roy, “The Long Read: Who Are the New Jihadis,” The Guardian, April 13, 2017, 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis, 3, 6.  
9 Roy, “The Long Read,” 1, 8, 9.  
10 Roy, “The Long Read,” 9.  
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from Muslim lands, and their motivations lie in what Roy terms “pure revolt.”11 He further 
posits that the radical youth advertise jihad as their banner in an attempt to avenge “their 
people,” referring to a global community of Muslims; yet he argues that there is no real 
link to be found that might connect the terrorists and their imagined constituents.12 In fact, 
from Roy’s empirical classification of roughly 100 people over the last 20 years, most 
French terrorists emerge after a sudden renewal of religious observance, taking action 
shortly following a “religious ‘reconversion’ or ‘conversion’” that took place outside any 
normal Islamic community structures13  
In addition to an individual profile of French jihadists, Roy’s support for an 
“Islamization of radicalism” theory identifies what he believes to be ideological 
inconsistencies within the violent Islamist movement. He first cites a difference between 
the Islam of branded jihadist groups, like ISIS and al-Qaeda, and the French jihadist’s 
Islam.14 In his view, the former is based in a “methodological tradition of exegesis,” while 
the young French jihadists only care about violence and a heroic self-image.15 Roy 
describes the caliphate as a fantastical idea with no chance for strategic success, explicating 
that it only provides the “myth of an ideological entity” to angry nihilists looking to validate 
their behavior behind perceived theological legitimacy.16 All of Roy’s points derive from 
the idea that religious radicalization is not the first step toward political radicalization in 
France, even though he acknowledges the common understanding that jihadism stems from 
Salafism.17 
Gilles Kepel approaches the problem of French terrorism from nearly the opposite 
perspective from that of Roy. They argue that renewed terrorism in France is a rise of 
violent Islamism, which had been brewing for decades in French society, then manifested 
                                                 
11 Roy, “The Long Read,” 2.  
12 Roy, “The Long Read,” 3.  
13 Roy, “The Long Read,” 5, 6.  
14 Roy, “The Long Read,” 8.  
15 Roy, “The Long Read,” 8.  
16 Roy, “The Long Read,” 2.  
17 Roy, “The Long Read,” 7.  
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itself in the confluence of third generation jihadism and a “third generation of French 
Islam.”18 Evolutionary differences between generations of Muslims in France are essential 
to his argument.19 Kepel understands the first generation of French Muslims as the original 
post-colonial immigrants, having little desire or ability to influence the French political 
scene. The second generation emerged via a moderate level of activism that gave birth to 
a “new political self-consciousness among French Muslims” in the early 1980s.20 However, 
Kepel argues that in 2005, riots in the Parisian suburbs following a set of perceived 
injustices against Muslims by French police triggered another major shift. The resultant 
widening of “ethno-religious fissures in the social fabric” supported the rise of a youth led, 
ground-up Muslim movement meant to redefine group solidarity.21 The international 
jihadist movement had pervasively been in the background for second and third generation 
Muslims, and as previously noted, it was making its own generation shifts. The third 
generation French Muslims split with their predecessors of the late 20th century by 
disengaging from domestic politics. Instead, they identified with the hardships of a 
worldwide Muslim community as described by fundamentalist Islamists through a 
persistent internet presence.  
Unlike Roy, who seems to favor a fundamental framework of class struggle, Kepel 
advocates a problem framing methodology based on identity struggle. He sees polarization 
occurring not only in the Muslim community but among Gallic French people as well—
each group protecting its own version of a moral worldview. Within French society, the 
nationalist camp of the “true French” pits against the “globalized empire,” while “righteous 
Muslims” contest the “hell-bound Kuffar.”22 Kepel considers right-wing nationalism and 
Islamism as “parallel conduits for expressing grievances,” and that each vies to emplace 
                                                 
18 Gilles Kepel, Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2017), 8. 
19 Mark Lilla, “How the French Face Terror,” New York Review of Books, March 24, 2016, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/03/24/how-the-french-face-terror/, 5.  
20 Lilla, “How the French Face Terror,” 5.  
21 Kepel, Terror in France, xviii.  
22 Kepel, Terror in France, 4.  
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its own specific values-based reality on French society.23 Again, in Kepel’s view, a 
wholesale breakthrough to terrorism occurred after the internet provided a wealth of 
extremist ideology to mobilizing Muslims.24 
Roy and Kepel also pursue contrasting viewpoints over the age-old debate of push 
versus pull factors in the motivation for movements. Roy supports a “push” explanation, 
which draws on discrimination and social exclusion as internal inspiration for seeking 
violence.25 Conversely, Kepel counters with an emphasis on “pull” factors from terrorist 
ideologues and Salafi preachers that provide external stimulus for religious-based 
terrorism.26 Interestingly, Kepel does not disregard socioeconomic conditions as 
contributory matters, and likewise includes a range of technological, religious, and broad-
based political developments in his theory.27 Additionally, Kepel’s views find support in 
this thesis, which bases its argument in evolutionary trends in jihadist activity and a 
widespread identity struggle within French society. 
2. French Experiences in Counterterrorism 
Terrorism brings an extraordinary dynamic to the everyday lives of citizens that 
shapes both the public expectations and the organizational goals of counterterrorist 
agencies. While the chances of becoming a victim of terrorism are incredibly small when 
compared to more endemic modes of fatality, like vehicle accidents or medical aliments, 
the psychological impact of terrorism transcends these more common social threats.28 The 
general public extrapolates anxiety and dread from terrorist attacks because “it appears 
utterly impossible to know when and where such an event might take place.”29 The next 
attack might occur in a location that one considered ordinarily safe—just the way it 
                                                 
23 Kepel, Terror in France, 4.  
24 Jytte Klausen, “Terror in the Terroir,” Foreign Affairs, October 4, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-08-15/terror-terroir, 1.  
25 Klausen, “Terror in the Terroir,” 3.  
26 Klausen, “Terror in the Terroir,” 3.  
27 Lilla, “How the French Face Terror,” 5.  
28 Jason Burke, The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy (New York: New 
Press, 2015), 216.  
29 Burke, The New Threat, 216.  
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happened in previous attacks—rendering almost any place a potential target. For this 
reason, citizens expect the goal of counterterrorism activities to transcend simple 
investigation and prosecution and instead perform preventive actions that give the public a 
sense that the state can provide safety in its ordinary places.30 
Adaptation to France’s counterterrorist policies span several decades and involve 
changes at both the institutional and organizational levels. Evaluation of these two 
independent levels helps distinguish France from the rest of the world in terms of its 
approach to fighting terrorism. Frank Foley lays the groundwork for this distinction 
through his exploration of “interinstitutional conventions” and “organizational routines.”31 
They appropriately distinguish influences that come from the top down and from the 
bottom up, respectively.32 He argues that the relationship between security agencies and 
the judiciary are adapted at the institutional level, while refinements to the interaction 
between the police and intelligence agencies occur at the organizational level.  
a. Interinstitutional Conventions 
The way major institutional branches of French government interact with each other 
enables a counterterrorist framework that is uniquely French when compared to those of 
the international community. Foley describes these interinstitutional conventions as 
“formal rules, standard operating procedures, and norms which regulate…the relationships 
between individuals across the various institutions of state.”33 The historically 
hypercentralized nature of the French government allows it to consolidate some 
responsibilities of its branches without consideration for constitutional checks and balances 
present in many other Western countries.34 Foley refers specifically to the inquisitorial 
system of the French judiciary that permits it active involvement in investigations.35 This 
                                                 
30 Frank Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and 
France,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (September 2009): 441, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903132920.  
31 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism.”  
32 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 452.  
33 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 450.  
34 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 451.  
35 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 451.  
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is in contrast to the adversarial system of many democracies that relegates the judiciary to 
a position of arbitration between a prosecution and defense. Through the French precedent, 
the judicial branch has leveraged access to security agencies that are otherwise the 
responsibility of the executive branch.36 The overarching governmental context here 
provided the framework for major reforms beginning in 1986 that gave authority for 
counterterrorist operations to the judicial branch, under the purview of investigative 
magistrates. 
b. Organizational Routines 
Ironically, the penchant for centralized authority remained at the institutional level 
of government, as lower level agency interaction took on a familiar, personality-based 
nature. Foley defines organizational routines as “recurrent interaction patterns,” which 
describe the behavior of any number of agencies with each other.37 By that definition, he 
concludes that French agencies have an informal approach to reforms, an environment of 
extensive cooperation, and a relatively unbalanced distribution of that cooperation among 
one another.38  
While the next section details the rise of investigative magistrates in the 
counterterror system, a brief definition of these particular judges will assist in expanding 
the nature of French organizational routines. Investigative magistrates control the activities 
of intelligence gatherers and law enforcement for the purpose of developing cases against 
prospective terrorists and uncovering terror plots. While this adds a highly preventative 
dimension to law enforcement, it also creates and sustains a very ad hoc system of 
cooperation between the intelligence and judicial branches that relies on trust built through 
personal relationships.39 Adaptations to magistrates’ routines are made “on the ground” 
and “unregulated by a central authority.”40  
                                                 
36 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 451.  
37 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 443.  
38 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 471–473.  
39 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 446. 
40 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” 471, 472.  
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Informal cooperation is efficient and adaptable but also has the negative side effect 
of disenfranchising agencies not in the cooperative.41 As magistrates favor particular 
agencies, as they favored the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire after 1998, 
competing agencies in either intelligence or law enforcement potentially lose their 
influence within the security community.42 During this time, issues of information 
management and ambiguity on the overall responsibility of individual agencies created 
unhappy feelings among the collective security community.43 Foley makes a very astute 
observation regarding the disconnection between institutional and organizational level 
oversight, when he notes 
Relying on this informal judicial-intelligence cooperation, the French 
government did not undertake any top-down structural reorganization of its 
counterterrorist agencies, neither after its own bombings of 1995–1996 nor 
after the 9/11 attacks on America and subsequent Islamist terror attacks on 
Spain, Britain, and Algeria.44 
From this passage, Foley enumerates five opportunities for adaptation that were lost by the 
French system of counterterrorism. Considering the simultaneous evolution of the jihadist 
threat toward leaderless, decentralized attacks, this may have been a critical failure in an 
otherwise exemplary French system. Organizational routines in counterterrorism rooted 
potential changes to its methodology in the individual personalities of the investigative 
magistrates. In hindsight, it is wholly unreasonable to expect that those lower level 
operatives performing daily work in the intelligence-law enforcement-prosecution cycle 
would be capable of also managing the state level analysis and international diplomacy 
necessary for a whole-of-government response to a threat as dynamic as global jihad. 
Paradoxically, France’s statist legacy has helped foment the consolidation of law 
enforcement and intelligence activities under the judiciary while simultaneously 
preventing the state from taking any interest in oversight to those centralized activities.45 
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A degree of centralized control at the organizational level may have served the 
French counterterror structure well in two ways. Primarily, it alleviates the 
counterproductive infighting between various intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
competing for relevance in the anarchy of the magistrate-led system. Second, a supra-
agency coordinating body could spend time and effort analyzing threats and trends outside 
the immediate interest of France to understand the next turn in the road of jihadist behavior.  
c. Four Modern Periods of French Counterterrorism 
The primacy of investigative magistrates did not occur spontaneously with jihadist 
threats on French soil but evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s to reflect a desire for 
increased security by the French public. France has an extensive history adapting to 
terrorism of all kinds over the centuries, and the latest wave of religious-inspired violence 
proves its continued resilience and adaptability. However, the magistrate system  has faced 
criticism for its borderline illiberal methods and extensive authority in prosecuting 
potential threats.46 Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan provide some context for how this 
system arose by categorizing France’s experience with jihadism into four eras. Sanctuary, 
accommodation, suppression, and prevention chronologically classify the shifting French 
approach and provide a roadmap to the expectations and routines of French counterterrorist 
agencies47 
(1) Sanctuary 
Prior to 1986, France maintained a compartmented viewpoint of how it should 
address threats from international terrorism. France considered it a foreign policy problem, 
vice a domestic issue that should involve law enforcement—even while France felt its 
effects on the homefront.48 By this logic, the French political establishment decided to 
allow terrorist groups to live and operate in France with impunity as long as the state 
received no ill treatment from its malevolent visitors. This was a clear sign of weakness 
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from the French state, which ostensibly maintained secret relations with terror groups to 
manage the détente and proved an eventual lesson to the international community of the 
ineffectiveness of declaring neutrality with terrorists.49 The policy was simultaneously an 
irritant to France’s Western brethren, who remained potential targets of the terrorists 
harbored in France.50  
(2) Accommodation  
A series of terrorist attacks rocked Paris in 1986 and motivated a definitive pivot in 
France’s counterterrorist policy. Over the course of three waves of attacks from February 
to September of that year, the French public experienced hundreds of injuries and the death 
of 11 citizens at the hands of the Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political 
Prisoners (CSPPA).51 This was a direct result of French foreign policy conflicting with 
state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East in the early 1980s. Attacks by the CSPPA 
sought to drive France toward favorable policy changes with states such as Libya, Syria, 
and Iran.52 Since the French populace had tired of the “weak state” sanctuary practices in 
the homeland and would not support further negotiations within the sovereignty, 
government leaders pursued accommodation in their foreign policy approach to gain 
domestic peace.53 The spree of violence in 1986 was sated by multiple adjustments to 
French affairs in Middle Eastern countries, and, as Michel Wieviorka reveals, when “faced 
with international terrorism, France, we might say, followed a policy of diplomatic 
activities that was guided by the will of terrorist states.”54 
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(3) Suppression 
Fortunately, the French government did not rely solely on an offshore version of 
terrorist cooperation but also responded to CSPPA violence with the legislation of 
September 9, 1986. While foreign accommodation was the “quick fix” to violence in 1986, 
the September law firmly established long-term counterterrorism planning in the context 
of domestic security reforms. Among several changes to the security infrastructure, the law 
created new bodies within the interior and justice ministries specifically tailored to foster 
cooperation among domestic agencies.55  
However, most important was the creation of positions for seven investigating 
magistrates.56 As previously mentioned, these positions facilitate the confluence of 
intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecutorial activities under localized direction. Their 
powers range across investigation, detainment, wiretapping, directing searches, and issuing 
subpoenas.57 The investigative magistrates’ role and power derives from their authority to 
handle cases that fit the propriety definition of terrorism laid out in the law of 1986, “acts 
committed by individuals or groups that have as a goal to gravely trouble public order by 
intimidation or terror.”58 Ideally, these new positions would take responsibility for 
“assembling a complete picture from the various different institutional sources, for assuring 
information flows between the various agencies [and] for providing coordinated direction 
to the intelligence and police services.”59 
The law of 1986 also filled the judicial void left by the abolition of the State 
Security Court system in 1981.60 A leftover of the Algerian war for independence, the State 
Security Court was a system separate from the official French judiciary and prosecuted 
specifically Algerian offenses by a significantly more illiberal standard than that of public 
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courts.61 While the removal of the State Security Court was a step in right direction in terms 
of equal rights, after 1981 there was simply no system in place to address the specifics of 
terrorist attackers. Despite the perception that investigative magistrates wield too much 
power in terrorist cases, they do operate in the same court system as the rest of the French 
judiciary and ultimately serve to present mature cases to other impartial judges in the 
French court. 
(4) Prevention 
Jihadist violence would not return to France until the mid-1990s with the rise of the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during the Algerian civil war. When the Algerian military 
blocked the Islamic Salvation Front, an Islamist political group, from taking power in 1992, 
Algeria descended into an atmosphere of violent militancy. The jihadi-inspired GIA posed 
a significant security threat to France because of its deadly tactics and expansionist 
rhetoric.62 As a result, during major operations in 1994 and 1995 France put into full 
practice the magisterial system of counterterrorism, which included the dismantling of the 
Chalabi network, a support group for anti-government forces in Algeria.63 Although France 
suffered several devastating attacks in 1995 at the hands of the GIA, investigating 
magistrates were able to quickly piece together cases against terrorists using their in-depth 
“almost cultural understanding of the Islamist movement” to reduce the investigating time 
of potential cases and affect arrests quickly—key milestones in effective prevention.64  
Experience gained from the fight against GIA terrorism in 1995 led to the creation 
of even more preventative measures and additional breadth of influence for investigative 
magistrates. Identifying the importance of logistical support to the proverbial “bomb 
thrower,” French amendments passed in 1996 defined material support to terrorism itself a 
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terrorist act.65 This gave the magistrates and their intelligence/law enforcement arms 
additional reach into French society. 
French counterterrorist agencies made modest changes over the proceeding 15 
years, as bourgeoning technologies required the state to consider new information and 
cyber realms in its counterterrorist strategy.66 However, despite the perception that 
everything was under control in France while the rest of the world reeled from attacks, a 
global undercurrent of extremism would soon reach French shores. 
3. Game Changer—The First French Lone Wolf 
In 2012, Mohamed Merah broke the record of a decades long security success story 
in France, ushering the arrival of an individualized version of jihad that eventually plunged 
the nation into a new era of identity politics and counterterrorist policy. The endgame 
mechanics of how Merah perpetrated the murders of seven people within a week resembled 
the violent tactics of many generations of terrorism, but the long pathway of his 
radicalization—answering why he engaged in such incomprehensible savagery—supports 
a definite pivot of jihadist terrorism toward decentralized Salafist-inspired violence. 
There is consensus in terrorism scholarship that the vast majority of jihadists are 
not clinically unstable, as multiple studies have shown that mental illness is not a 
significant causation for violent extremist behavior.67 To the contrary, they make 
calculated, and in their minds, logical conclusions that point to the use of violence. Merah 
was no exception. Although steeped in a culture of hate, intolerance, poverty, and crime, 
by all accounts Merah was a rational actor, described early on by social services as, “an 
intelligent child who had capacities to succeed.”68 
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Merah was a troubled youth that found support for radicalization at every turn. He 
was essentially a child of the streets, growing up in a gypsy suburb of Toulouse, France.69 
His parents cast the mold, defaulting to abuse and neglect of Merah and his siblings within 
a household rife with anti-Semitic, anti-French, and violent rhetoric.70 His parents divorced 
at an early age; his mother eventually remarried to an Islamist, while his father partook in 
drug dealing.71 Notably, his siblings played key roles in fostering and developing his 
radicalized mindset. His older brother, Abdelkader, and sister, Souad, were staunch Salafist 
supporters. In particular, Souad provided financial support to Merah’s endeavors and 
celebrated her brother’s eventual death with admiration.72  
At 19 years old, Merah began a 20 month prison sentence for petty crime and his 
transition from young thug life to jihadism began.73 By the time of his release in 2009, 
Merah had communicated with family members about his duty to God and the Prophet 
Mohammed, and he showed open fascination with the idea of holy war.74 Almost 
immediately upon his release, Merah began aggressive attempts to join militant groups or 
to put himself in a position to conduct jihad. He tried to find militants in Algeria, he 
searched for groups across the Middle East and finally smuggled himself into Afghanistan 
through Tajikistan in an effort to be captured by and join the Taliban.75 Circumstances 
thwarted each attempt until Merah finally made a trip to Lahore, Pakistan where he found 
what might have been low-level associates to al-Qaeda.76 With merely a few days 
instruction by a local radical in weapons handling, Merah returned to France with his own 
personalized agenda in mind.77 
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France initially labeled Merah a “lone wolf” attacker. In part, French security 
services may have preferred this classification in defense of their failure to prevent the 
deaths caused by Merah—particularly the executions of a Jewish rabbi and his children a 
week after the initial murders—citing the elusiveness of such a threat.78 However, as the 
next chapter explores in detail, there is debate over the idea of terrorists who are completely 
isolated from outside influence or support. Depending on one’s definition of a lone wolf, 
this is a legitimate debate. Given the circumstances regarding Merah’s pathway to violence, 
he certainly had a host of influence and support; however, as Merah told negotiators during 
his terminal showdown with police, “everything I did, I did of my own free will, without 
any influence by anyone who said to me one day ‘do this, do that.’ I did it all alone. I 
organized it all alone. No one was with me.”79 
Merah was his own advocate in every way, including terrorism’s necessary media 
campaign. He filmed each of his attacks from a first-person viewpoint and then edited the 
content to include narration and musical accompaniment before submitting the tapes to Al-
Jazeera.80 Merah hedged a reliance on mass media with extensive YouTube and twitter 
postings as well.81 His combination of violence and fledgling media mastery were a 
snapshot to what the ISIS would later codify in official organizational strategy as a way to 
mobilize transnational support and radical sentiment.82 Merah provided France with its first 
bitter taste of new terrorism. 
4. The New French Experience 
France experienced a major transition in its domestic security environment after 
2015, and this resulted in equally radical changes to its homeland security ideology and 
counterterrorism strategy. Prior to the November 2015 attacks in Paris and the surrounding 
area, the French government seemed a model for Western homeland security structures. 
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The French government regarded terrorist actions as an “expression of extremism,” vice 
an act of war.83 France’s ideological response was contrary to the U.S. model—America 
was simultaneously waging a “Global War on Terror”—instead placing a primacy on 
human interaction, particularly human intelligence gathering.84 The French system decried 
paramilitary operations, opting instead for infiltration tactics and a close relationship with 
local communities to keep pace with local sentiments.85 Lower level operatives were highly 
trained in recognizing behavioral and cultural nuance within their assigned demographics, 
and international cooperation at the higher levels was routine.86 
After the “French 9/11” on November 13, 2015, both President Hollande and 
Interior Secretary Cazeneuve declared France “at war with terrorists.”87 What was once 
regarded as a finesse-based counterterrorist strategy quickly turned into a heavy-handed 
operation. Racial profiling and unbounded home searches are now commonplace in 
France.88 Military style pre-emption tactics are pervasive on the French homefront.89 In 
experts’ views, the effect has been completely counterproductive. Lower class Muslim 
immigrants, who are the target of most police actions, have become embittered, and this 
has made integration of law enforcement or intelligence officers within those communities 
almost impossible.90 
In conjunction with a militarized homeland security strategy, French security 
agencies reevaluated their ability to “connect the dots” within a host of state-run 
intelligence organizations. Robin Simcox considers the multifaceted intelligence complex 
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part of the problem. Six different agencies report to different bosses across the scope of 
civilian, military, and executive branch leadership.91 As of 2016, a parliamentary 
commission called for consolidating efforts under one agency with widespread intelligence 
sharing the ultimate goal.92 Bureaucracy is not the only shortcoming with regard to French 
counterterrorism, however. Each of the intelligence services tends to specialize in 
exploiting human sources rather than more automated forms of information gathering and 
surveillance.93 Without robust systematic methods of monitoring threat trends, France 
misses the opportunity to connect the dots once again. 
The French judiciary continues to effectively centralize the French security 
structure under investigative magistrates. The magistrates enable much faster development 
of threat conditions and expedite the ruling over suspected terrorists, but their methods also 
increase the level of invasive state presence among the citizenry.94 This system may realize 
the connection of “more dots,” but that benefit comes at the cost of incrementally reduced 
liberal democracy—the sort of checks and balances that are so far immutable in American 
society.95  
Unsurprisingly, France’s transition to a paramilitary counterterrorist strategy has 
not yielded positive results, as the spectacular attacks that have continued since 2015 
illustrate. However, the unanticipated reemergence of violent Islamist extremism during 
an era of relative public-private cooperation remains unexplained. As Simcox states, “The 
liberal values of the republic and that of the reactionary Islamists living in France remain 
irreconcilable.”96 What is the nature of the impasse? What forced the transition into a 
devolved relationship between immigrant Muslims and the French state? The answer to 
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these questions may provide valuable insights for French security institutions and Western 
democracies worldwide. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines three general hypotheses. They are not specific explanations; 
rather, they help to frame new sets of questions that progressively guide the research 
design. First, the resurgence of violent Islamist activity in France may be the result of 
reaching a tipping point of socioeconomic grievance, cultural tensions, or both. Particularly 
due to France’s colonial heritage in North Africa, any injustice easily reminds Muslims of 
subjugation and humiliation under those imperial activities. Such stratification still exists 
and is manifest in large, low-income settlements, or banlieues, of French Muslims of poor 
socioeconomic status. Cultural conflicts between the norms of French society and those 
from traditional Muslim origin may be the crux of the problem, particularly with respect to 
the unpredictable, resurgent nature of the threat. Culture is a social aspect that has very 
personal interpretations even within a relatively small, homogeneous community. 
Therefore, culturally motivated behavior can vary widely at an individual level, making 
recognition and response to changes in the threat environment a difficult proposition for 
state level agencies. Homegrown sentiment can subsequently find both agreement and 
support quickly and easily in the ether of social media, leading to a rapid radicalization in 
thought and compartmented indications of violent intentions. 
Second, resistance of the greater Muslim community to communicate and integrate 
with French society on established Western terms may also contribute to the emergence of 
violent outbreaks. While many other immigrant populations have experienced some 
difficulty assimilating to a new part of the world, French Muslims seem be struggling in 
particular. That struggle is exacerbated by increasingly skeptical Western communities that 
see the specter of violent jihad as an attack by Muslims on the Western way of life. 
Meanwhile, enclaves of marginalized Muslims act as echo chambers of radical sentiment 
against a culturally distinct Gallic population. Reducing “grievances, afflictions, and 
injustices” would aid in bringing legitimacy to the liberal paradigm of Western 
governments, thereby reducing some of the socioeconomic division and identity crises that 
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stem from “relative marginalization.” 97 However, continued resistance to embracing 
Western values helps maintain an ideological wall between cultures. 
Third, not only does the lack of hierarchical structure to the new terrorism change 
the way counterterrorist agencies approach the problem, but it also eliminates the ability 
for the French state to engage politically or economically with known terrorist actors. The 
leaderless movement dictates that there is no opportunity for negotiation over grievances 
or indication of soured relations that might suggest a heightened threat level. Unlike the 
“disciplined” deals cut by French officials with Hezbollah in the 1980s to maintain peace, 
there is no bargaining table with regard to the new threat.98 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
France is the subject of analysis, chosen from among other European countries, 
because of its large Muslim population, mature counterterror infrastructure, historically 
liberal democracy, and its puzzling phenomenon of a strong recurrent terrorist threat 
following a period of relative peace. In 1997, a string of violent attacks from the Armed 
Islamic Group during the mid-1990s ended, thus beginning a period of relative peace on 
the French homefront. While France still experienced periodic separatist violence, low-
scale property damage was the leading result, and authorities recorded very few injuries.99 
Bloody attacks in Toulouse and Montauban in the spring of 2012 gave warning of the 
resurgence to come, as a dense crop of jihadi-inspired attacks killed and injured hundreds 
of people from late 2014 through 2017.  
To test the veracity of my three hypotheses, the puzzle requires consideration of 
several items that potentially contributed to unbalancing the relative safety of the early 
2000s. First, this project needed a definition of new terrorism for comparison with the 
threat in France that sprang up in 2012. Is France the target of such newly styled attacks 
and are democracies like France equipped to handle it? The evolution of France’s 
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counterterrorism policies and organizational routines was matched up against the nature of 
the newest wave of violence. This helped to determine if potentially underdeveloped 
counterterrorism activities permitted the problem to arise, and as a corollary, if any 
adaptations to the system could provide an effective solution to the phenomenon. 
Second, the thesis needed to determine if there is resistance to integration for 
Muslims in France. Socioeconomic conditions and the specific grievances of the Muslim 
population during the peaceful interim period requires understanding. Cultural friction 
could very well be a two-way street, with Gallic French resisting the arrival of Muslims 
into communities and from Muslims themselves, who resist accepting Western ways and 
French social institutions. Is there an ideological wall separating the two camps, and if so, 
is there room for compatibility? This research broaches the literature regarding a clash of 
civilizations, historically met with political disapproval in much of Western scholarship. 
Therefore, a distinction between Islam and Islamism when making any qualitative 
determinations on assimilability is essential. Polling data and other empirical evidence 
from terror databases established local French sentiments. Background evidence includes 
details about how Muslims have fared in French society since the decolonization of Algeria 
when significant Muslim immigration first began. As Muslims have integrated into French 
society, it is critical to understand how they identify on both the communal and personal 
levels. How important is Islam in this identity as compared to other factors, such as 
ethnicity or nationality? 
F. ROADMAP 
The body of this research project breaks down into two substantive chapters. The 
first, Chapter II, focuses specifically on the characterization of a new terrorism and how 
democracies, such as France, might respond on an ideological level. Chapter II begins with 
a practical look at the debate over new terrorism. This chapter details a typographical 
analysis of the current theories, establishing the existing camps and supporting evidence 
for each theory. This analysis will attempt to give a collective reckoning of the motivations 
and behavior of the new threat. Three subsections of the chapter elaborate key academic 
opinions that best support a new terrorism theory, codified by leaderless jihad, a clash of 
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civilizations, and social media. When considered together, these component parts show an 
attempt by extreme Islamists to polarize the global population into equally antagonizing 
positions. Chapter II also includes a review of how democracies interact with terrorism, to 
include how they might unwittingly incite violence from Salafi Islamist hardliners.  
As the second substantive chapter, Chapter III closely examines societal and 
institutional influences on France’s Muslim population and their potential contribution to 
resurgent violence. Chapter III also examines the role of identity conflict in shaping the 
environment for jihadism. Additionally, it begins by focusing on state-society interaction 
in France. It describes church-state patterns that set the conditions for Muslim assimilation, 
highlighting the strong role of laïcité100 in the French political debate. The research 
emphasizes how these structures interact with and affect the majority Muslim community 
in general and radicalized Islamists separately. Chapter III also supports the concept of an 
identity crisis occurring for Muslims in the French state. It uses an anthropological model 
to help frame the identity conflict between global jihadists and the rest of the world and 
then applies it to the existing context of France in the 21st century. 
Finally, Chapter IV concludes the thesis. By juxtaposing this project’s three major 
themes—the routines of French counterterrorism activities, the nature of the new threat in 
France, and the social context for Muslims in the French state—I draw recommendations 
for adjustment at both the state and agency levels, which require a greater understanding 
of perceptions among France’s contesting interest groups. The chapter also includes my 
recommendations for further research focus on events in France after the 2012 and 
subsequent attacks, as well as continued evaluation of popular sentiment among European 
Muslim populations. 
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II. NEW TERRORISM 
On January 24, 1878, Vera Zasulich strode into the office of General Fyodor 
Tropov, Governor of St. Petersburg, and amid a room of petitioners fired a pistol point 
blank at the local executive.101 During her trial for the attempted assassination, Zasulich 
proclaimed herself to be “a terrorist, not a killer.”102 On a spring morning 135 years later, 
Michael Adebolajo ran down Lee Rigby in the streets of London with his car. Then after 
hacking at his limp body with a meat cleaver, he delivered a prepared speech in which he 
remarked, “The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying 
daily by British soldiers.”103 The Rigby killing occurred in the year following deadly 
attacks in Toulouse, France and only three days before the nonfatal stabbing of a French 
soldier in Paris.104 These violent events were the prelude to a deluge of claimed religiously 
inspired violence that swept the French homeland after December 2014.105 Counterterrorist 
agencies, once highly touted for their specialized ability to identify and prevent violent 
extremism, struggled to stay ahead of the next terrorist event. Even though there is more 
than a century separating the politically motivated violent acts of Zasulich and assailants 
such as Adebolajo, one can draw both parallels and differences about the events; however, 
should we consider present day attacks by violent Islamist extremists as occurring in a new 
age of terrorist activity?  
Today’s scholars participate in a theoretical debate on the characterization of new 
terrorism. If there is a new terrorist threat, what are its defining features? This chapter 
argues that a new phenomenon is underway that combines factors from historical precedent 
with environmental adaptations in thought and method in an age of advancing technology 
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and globalization. The first section elaborates on three factors that distinguish the new 
terrorism phenomenon: leaderless jihad, conflict between civilizations, and social media. 
Religious ideology also plays a major role in affecting the portion of Muslim populations 
that are undecided about the use of political violence—a grouping the ISIS terms “the gray 
zone.”106 The second section addresses the relationship of advanced democracies with a 
global jihadist threat to provide the theoretical background for how well France was 
postured in 2012 and beyond. Democracies like France have a stake in understanding and 
maintaining the gray zone; therefore, this chapter examines the interaction of democratic 
states with new terrorism based on their propensity to either foment or fight radical Islamist 
activity. 
A. NEWER TERRORISM? 
To capture all viewpoints of the conversation on “new terrorism” in a brief 
analytical review is an insurmountable task, as the expression produces a wide range of 
support from within the terrorism academy. Consensus is not complete on whether 
terrorism experts should use such a term as new terrorism, or if the phenomenon that it 
describes even exists. Scholars who discredit the notion of a new terrorist threat draw on 
multiple examples of past history wherein previous terrorist movements have exhibited 
much of the current day behavior, and they maintain that the violence of today is simply 
repackaged into different groups and different locations. For example, Martha Crenshaw 
posits, “The differences are of degree rather than kind,” yet she concedes that “differences 
among groups and differences in patterns of terrorism over time do exist…[and] are due to 
a changing environment”107 While Crenshaw brings many descriptors of terrorism to light 
for analysis—from terrorist goals and methods to their organizational structure and reasons 
for radicalization—her conclusions seem steeped in a bias that the new terrorism theory 
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only serves political ends and that world leaders desire the term as a justification for radical 
and costly campaigns against what they consider a holistically different threat.108 
Brigitte Nacos echoes Crenshaw’s sentiment, stating, “terrorism itself has not 
fundamentally changed with respect to objectives, methods, targets, propaganda.”109 Nacos 
also supports the notion that any new development in terrorism results from “a different 
environment than their predecessors.”110 Overall, critics seem to maintain an inconsistent 
standpoint when invalidating new terrorism, as exemplified by Nacos’s offhand use of 
“contemporary terrorism” to describe changes in terrorist activities in the post-Cold War 
era.111 
Proponents of the new terrorism theory seem to advocate across three major school 
of thought. Each grouping addresses a different factor in the rise of global jihadists. The 
first and rather universal group emphasizes a decentralized and transnational pool of 
terrorist actors who do not rely on a hierarchical structure for command and control. This 
concept has taken the form of more familiar terms like “lone wolves,” “wolf packs,” or 
simply “leaderless jihad.” A second school of thought is the idea of the East and West in a 
clash of civilizations. This theme embodies the role of ideology and— in the specific case 
of jihadists—religion in dictating the ways, means and ends of terror attacks. Finally, the 
third prevailing thought, the use of information technology, specifically the Internet and 
social media, presents a resourceful new mode of support to the current global Islamist 
groups. A review of jihadist leaders’ dramatic desire for territory as an indicator of what 
may be in the future for religiously inspired terrorism is also included in support of the idea 
that terrorism is continually evolving. 
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1. Leaderless Jihad 
In recent years, the Western world has been regularly shocked by the terror of what 
seem like wanton strikes by individuals or small groups with little connection to anything 
outside of their own self-professed mission of killing for the honor of Allah. The train 
bombing in Madrid in 2004, followed by the 7/7 attacks in London the following year, 
began a string of “major Islamic extremist strikes in Western Europe.”112 The brutal 
murders by Mohamed Merah, the attacks on Charlie Hebdo that claimed the lives of 13 
Frenchmen, and more recently, numerous vehicle-born slaughters of hapless civilians seem 
initially to have no positive connection to a higher order with a clear political end state.113 
The scholarship on leaderless jihad covers a broad range of changes pursuant to the 
threat, but a global “movement of Islamic militancy,” which has no precedent “anything 
like the present scale,” underpins the differences.114 Jason Burke details the rise and role 
of al Qaeda and the ISIS in shaping the current terror landscape, but he considers “the most 
important developments in Islamic militancy over the last three decades…[the] emergence, 
consolidation, and expansion of what can be called the movement of Islamic militancy 
emphasis added].”115 According to Burke, this movement is buried in a large segment of 
the Muslim population that “speaks the language,” even if they do not immediately take 
part in violence.116 Having interviewed extremists from across the world, Burke found that 
despite the wide variation in location and ethnic culture, they “all use the same vocabulary” 
in describing their “complaints, justifications and invocations.”117 This forms what he calls 
the “lingua franca of Islamic extremism.”118 Burke further states that a common language 
is foundational to describing a community, thereby supporting the notion that there is a 
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global community for Islamist extremism.119 This is a fundamental concept for leaderless 
jihad. As more scholars assert, the new nature of Islamist terrorism is its ability to operate 
with vast decentralization and with transnational influence. However, there must be some 
connective tissue to give a global movement cohesiveness; otherwise, it would profoundly 
and continually morph in the hands of its disparate agents. The common language of 
Islamist extremism provides terrorists a connection to something greater than themselves 
and anchors the movement despite its global reach. 
The large segment of the population to which Burke alludes is more specifically 
described by Paul Rogers as the “majority margins.”120 Rogers eliminates the top and 
bottom fifths of the socioeconomic spectrum from consideration, as these are respectively 
considered elites with no desire for political upheaval and the poorest of the poor who are 
concerned merely with survival. This leaves 60 percent of the Muslim population writ large 
that can fall victim to what enables the “common language” as Burke describes. Rogers 
terms the phenomenon “relative marginalization,” dissatisfaction with conditions when 
compared to expectations.121 He believes that revolts from these margins will become the 
new norm and that terror groups like ISIS are only a manifestation of this larger problem 
and not a phenomenon unto itself.122 By this line of thinking, Rogers disregards Islam as a 
fundamental issue and believes we are moving toward an age of insurgencies, vice a clash 
of civilizations between East and West.123 While ideology and cultural identity may play a 
part in codifying violent resistance, “movements will develop that are essentially anti-elite 
in nature and [thus] draw their support from people on the margins.”124 In this way, Rogers 
does not completely dismiss the role of ideology, but he asserts that over emphasizing a 
religious basis “ignores political, social and economic trends.”125 
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Rogers’s emphasis on socioeconomic marginalization as a source for Islamic 
militancy is not mutually exclusive with an ideologically based motivation. In fact, these 
two issues can be very mutually supportive of each other in the hands of skilled ideologues. 
Both al Qaeda and ISIS have used messages that combine social repression and religious 
duty to gain support from the margins. The careful combination of such symbiotic 
messaging produces a widely based propaganda with potential appeal to a large global 
audience at much deeper levels than if recruiting on any one issue alone. 
Keystone ideologues have messaged “leaderless jihad” for decades, so it should 
come as no surprise to astute terrorism scholars that a global jihadist threat should emerge. 
Osama Bin Laden understood the multifaceted aspect of messaging, and he used this 
knowledge to his advantage in garnering support for a fight against the “far enemy.”126 
Although a pioneer in the use of fledgling mobile video technology, Bin Laden quickly 
learned the nuance and importance of his outward imaging. The operational adaptation 
toward a leaderless movement is apparent in his short, colloquial so-called “fatwa” released 
in 1998. Bin Laden called for the “killing [of] Americans and their families—civilians and 
military—[as] an individual duty for every Muslim who can carry it out in any country 
where it proves possible.”127 At that time, a global leaderless movement had not yet 
manifested, but Bin Laden set an expectation that progressed during subsequent waves of 
jihadism and that the movement would use the information revolution to its advantage. Bin 
Laden’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, joined him in a call for decentralized 
violence. In 2001, al-Zawahiri made the following proclamation in “Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner”: 
It is always possible to track an American or a Jew, to kill him with a bullet 
or a knife, a simple explosive device, or a blow with an iron rod. Setting fire 
to their property is not difficult. With the means available, small groups can 
spread terror among Americans and Jews. 
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The Islamic movement in general and the jihad movement in particular must 
lead the battle to raise the community’s awareness.128 
It is apparent that by the early 2000s, leading jihadist ideologues set the precedent that they 
not only authorized but also expected violence in the name of the Islamic community.  
A focus on subordinate leadership and autonomy has sustained the recurrent wave 
of violence in France. With the exception of the November 2015 Paris spectacular, 
individuals using low-tech violence, such as stabbing or vehicle ramming, have conducted 
most jihadist attacks. It is apparent there has been an adaptation since the days of well-
structured GIA or Hezbollah attacks.  
Scholars cite changes beyond the European region that emphasize the adaptive 
nature of the threat. In describing the “New Jihad” in Saudi Arabia, Sherifa Zuhur makes 
the claim that there are strategic differences involved.129 Unlike their precursors, current 
terror groups can respond quickly to antiterror measures and can sustain significant loss of 
leadership while remaining viable—even deadly. Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares 
support this claim in their own description of contemporary al Qaeda networks. They assert 
that by empowering subgroups and maintaining consistent ideology in its public narrative, 
al-Qaeda ensures its adaptability in unpredictable forms.130 These new tactics and 
structures help define the decentralized and transnational nature of the new threat.  
Decentralization of operations does not necessarily mean that new terrorism lacks 
personal interaction or a framework of guiding principles. At first glance, networks and 
social relations may seem contradictory to a decentralizing definition of leaderless jihad; 
however, leading terrorism expert Boaz Ganor advocates there is a continuum for 
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organized network involvement and lone wolf attacks, which he describes at three levels.131 
At the lowest level, individuals take their own initiative and have no operational ties to 
terror groups but still receive inspiration from outside sources. In the middle are small, 
intensely loyal social groups that often gradually increase and reinforce the internal level 
of radicalization to their cause and have sporadic ties to more organized terrorist 
hierarchies. At the highest level, hierarchal terror organizations are involved in all stages 
of planning, funding, and execution. By this description, social groups and networks are 
actually a strong and integral part of the leaderless jihad movement. 
2. Clash of Civilizations 
The topic of East versus West is prevalent in discussions of jihadists, and it has 
significant bearing on defining new terrorism. As previously mentioned, Paul Rogers sees 
a major cultural or religious contest as a subordinate factor in defining the problem, but he 
does not speak for all major scholars on this topic. As one of the preeminent experts in the 
field of terrorism, Marc Sageman places heavy emphasis on what he terms the “moral 
outrage” of the Islamic community.132 This sentiment is the result of encroachment on 
Islamic lands and Muslim beliefs by both foreign “far” enemies and domestic “near” 
enemies. He also describes collateral damage from Western attacks in Muslim lands as a 
driving factor to this outrage. Sageman places specific emphasis on how the Muslim 
community rationalizes the reasons for that outrage and views the problem as nothing short 
of a “war on Islam” by the outside world.133 Aggrieved Muslims then find mobility in 
networks with extreme loyalty to each other and to their cause.  
Some scholars consider the restricted upward mobility and social integration of 
second-generation Muslim immigrants to Europe as driving factors behind the origins of 
new terrorism. For instance, Robert Leiken cites this demographic as experiencing an 
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identity crisis resulting from an inability to resolve their modern surroundings with the 
traditional nature of their Muslim faith.134 Both perceived and actual deprivation of the 
Muslim diaspora community helps reinforce the idea of a clash of civilizations. Extremist 
groups, like ISIS and al Qaeda, exploit the “loss of meaning and life purpose” experienced 
by second-generation Muslim immigrants in Western society as an in-road to radicalize 
potential recruits into their organizations.135 Second-generation Muslim youth look for 
belonging in the traditions of their parents and the culture of Western society, yet they fit 
into neither.136 The loss of identity that these individuals experience is essentially an 
internal clash of civilizations. Without the existence of a palpable conflict between Eastern 
and Western ways of life and of differing social norms and values, it is unlikely that such 
internal conflict would exist and correspondingly manifest in radicalization toward 
extremist tendencies. Describing a Western perspective, Jason Burke maintains that 
jihadist terrorist attacks’ most damaging effects are in the deterioration of relations between 
East and West on at both the global and local levels.137 Such distrust between cultures 
continues to drive the perception of a clash of civilizations.  
3. Social Media 
Many terrorism scholars find agreement in the significant role social media has 
played in transforming terrorist activities. In describing the impact of the Internet on human 
relations, Sageman finds that “the interactivity is revolutionary.”138 Web users are able to 
“collapse time and eliminate space” in the search for communities that share their 
viewpoints.139 This provides an important observation about potentially radicalizing 
Islamists: they come to the realm of social media with pre-existing notions of grievance or 
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ideology. Because “the intensity of feelings developed online rival those developed 
offline,” bonds form very quickly.140 As Matthew Levitt remarked, from “flash to bang” 
can be days or even hours now.141 
The impact of social media is not limited to the methods of radicalization and 
recruitment, but it is also essential to an adaptation of new terrorist strategy. According to 
Leiken, the projection of extreme violence via a strong media message overcomes the need 
for complicated spectaculars, as al Qaeda purposed in the 9/11 attacks.142 Similarly, 
Hoffman agrees that the “innovative use of social media has transformed the threat.”143 In 
particular, he points to Ganor’s organizational continuum of lone wolf terrorists as 
receiving intelligence and targets from organized groups via these methods, which the 
terrorists leverage to conduct attacks at their discretion in a decentralized, leaderless 
manner.144 
The ISIS has relied extensively on social media to advertise its message, quickly 
becoming an expert in adaptive methods of using the Internet toward its cause. ISIS deemed 
this new tool was deemed so powerful, they released Media Operative, You are a Mujahid, 
Too in 2015, which essentially directed the efforts of Muslims everywhere to engage in 
what Charlie Winter characterized as “media jihad.”145 The manual describes ideological, 
theological, and emotional bases for connecting with other jihadists and the best ways to 
elicit a supportive response on those grounds.146 Notably, this was the first time a major 
globally recognized jihadist terror group advertised full inclusion and status to individuals 
conducting media operations from the comfort of their own homes—recognition rivaling 
even the work of ISIS front line members. The ISIS bestowed upon at-home jihadists the 
honor and privilege that in previous generations only hardened mujahedeen received. Such 
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status and participation provides strong motivation for socially disaffected sideliners to 
enter the arena of media jihad and increase the volume in radical social media echo 
chambers. 
4. The Gray Zone 
In any polarizing debate, there is middle ground occupied by those that have 
sympathies with both sides. In the case of violent Islamist extremists, the debate is about 
the influence of one culture over another, specifically the subjugation of true Muslim 
believers by apostate governments and crusading Western militaries. On one side are the 
secular governments aligned with the Unites States and its allies, attempting to promote 
democratic institutions and liberal Western values. On the other side are the fundamental 
Islamist members of the Muslim population who believe living by the revealed law of Allah 
is the only permissible method of governance and way of life. As represented by Rogers’s 
majority margins, the middle ground represents a sizable population that may be undecided 
on which side to choose. 
In many ways, the goal of new terrorism is to motivate those in the gray zone into 
action. For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was explicit in his desire to force the hand of 
the “slumbering Sunnis.”147 Al-Zarqawi designed extremely violent attacks against Shia 
Muslims to elicit an equally extreme reaction from the Shia population—most specifically 
the Iraqi police and defense forces.148 He expected Sunni Muslims on the proverbial 
sidelines would spring into action in response to a repressive and violent Shia crackdown, 
thereby filling the ranks of his al-Qaeda affiliate and fulfilling their duty to conduct jihad. 
ISIS continued in this modus operandi, but it sent the violently divisive message on 
an international scale via disciplined and targeted media operations. Jason Burke identifies 
“the new threat” as an attack on the gray zone, primarily by ISIS, but also subsequently by 
a geographically disassociated global community grown via the ISIS Internet messaging 
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agenda.149 Burke mentions righteousness of the jihadist cause, legitimate organizational 
strategy, and the abilities of leadership as three areas for deliberation within the gray zone 
that, if assuaged, may sway undecided Muslims to support the cause of Islamist jihad 
further.150 These points will likely be the focus of effort in future jihadist information 
campaigns and should factor into the counterterrorist programs of target states. 
5. 21st Century Terrorism 
The argument of whether new terrorism exists eventually comes down to semantics. 
Presumably, there will be no major transformation in human nature affecting millennia-old 
social predispositions; therefore, any argument for a new terrorist threat must predicate on 
differences in the ways, means, and ends of violent extremism. If substantial changes to 
the human mindset arise from significant changes to the human environment, then a new 
paradigm forms that stirs new motivations, new methods, and new sustaining factors.  
a. Territory 
A focus on the importance of territory by the ISIS may become a new 
environmental change of interest to terrorism scholars. The quest for territory has ancient 
roots in the Islamic culture, but the basal movements that started in the 1980s under 
Abdallah Azzam to “liberate territory” from imperialist crusaders began a progression of 
jihadist motives. While not an advocate of leaderless resistance, Azzam was the first to 
shift the purview of jihad from regional to global.151 He released the Defense of Muslim 
Territories and called on all Muslims to participate in the fight for Afghanistan as a matter 
of fard ‘ayn, or individual obligation.152 However, his fatwa does not direct jihadists to 
advance the fight into surrounding states, declaring the conflict a “defensive jihad” and 
meant only to eliminate unbelievers from Muslim lands.  
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In the early 2000s, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began work not only to eliminate the 
U.S. coalition from Iraq but also to begin modest state building as well. Al-Zarqawi’s focus 
was on lands that would most easily concede to his ultraviolent brand of jihad, but 
subsequent leaders of his loosely affiliated al Qaeda hierarchy in Iraq had more ambitious 
goals in mind. Clearly, dominating territory is not a new desire of Islamist extremists, but 
the destruction of internationally recognized borders—as witnessed between Iraq and Syria 
under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—is dramatically new.153 Al-Baghdadi ordered the bulldozing 
of border signposts in a choreographed video production that followed his promise to 
destroy all countries’ borders.154 Controlling land lends an air of legitimacy to any ruling 
regime and—fundamental Islamist theology aside—was likely a major strategic center of 
gravity for the growing ISIS movement.  
Ironically, the value of sovereign territory extends to the leaderless movement as 
well. If a call for dispersed, decentralized action comes simply from another angry Muslim 
in front of his or her computer, the value of the message grows exponentially weaker. 
However, if that message comes from a declared caliph in a land ruled by pure sharia and 
won via violent seizure from perceived apostates, it sends the message that the campaign 
is alive and successful and that others who are faithful can do it too. 
b. In the Line of Revolutions 
The terrorism academy should reform the context in which it considers terrorism to 
allow a perspective that today’s terrorism might be new. The idea of changes in terrorism 
is not unlike considering changes that have occurred during civilizational revolutions 
throughout history as new. The multiple industrial revolutions in the United States during 
the 19th century served to increase productivity and efficiency within certain market 
sectors, which gave rise to drastic, periodic changes in industry.155 For example, 
revolutionary transportation systems still moved things from A to B as industry developed; 
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they just did so faster and farther because of innovations like rail and air travel. Such is the 
case with Islamist militancy in the 21st century. The technology and information 
revolutions have connected people—namely Muslims in this case—on a much broader 
scope and scale. Grievances and ideologies also find connections throughout a global 
community that is significantly more susceptible to information bias and the echo chambers 
of social media.  
The effect is a decentralized, marginalized, low-tech movement mobilized by 
religious ideology that can induce rapid and intensely negative effects on the relationships 
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities worldwide. In this regard, all scholars 
interested in developing an understanding of terrorism should continually maintain the 
mindset that it is new, lest they be found addressing yesterday’s threat, vice tomorrow’s. 
B. WHAT SHOULD A DEMOCRACY TO DO? 
The gray zone is of vital interest to democracies because swaying support from this 
sector of the population can often make the difference in successful antiterrorist campaigns. 
How do democratic states interact with a gray zone population, specifically Muslims, to 
gain this sort of support? This section addresses the potential shortcomings of democracies 
in the counterterror environment and shows that their institutions can be strong adversaries 
to extremism, given a moderated approach.  
1. Lessons from al Qaeda 
In studying the relationship between democracies and terrorist groups, Michael 
Freeman scrutinizes Western counterterrorist policy and identifies key areas for democratic 
states to consider when developing policy with Muslim populations. Freeman finds four 
influential factors that generate support for al Qaeda—a “global Salafi jihadist” group—to 
determine the impact that the spread of democracy might have on diminishing such 
support.156 Freeman cites military and cultural identity threats from the West as immediate 
grievances of the Muslim community, while economic and political failures within their 
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domestic societies represent enabling grievances.157 France has profound experiences in 
two of these areas that shape the environment for a global jihadist movement (Chapter III 
specifically analyzes identity threats and political failures in the French state). 
The result of Freeman’s investigation reveals that promoting democracy, in the 
context of Washington Consensus158 reforms, is a poor agent of change and likely to be 
counterproductive.159 Freeman recommends that Western states consider addressing 
immediate grievances directly, reducing or withdrawing military presence in contested 
regions or working to legitimatize local political regimes through increased justice and 
reduced corruption, for example.160 The idea that liberalizing fundamentals find resistance 
in Muslim countries should make a profound translation to existing democracies currently 
experiencing problems with new terrorism. Muslim apprehensions about the suitability of 
Western systems must prompt countries like France to examine their social program and 
gain a better understand how the Muslim community perceives its place in Westernized 
society. 
Freeman concludes with the unfortunate hypothesis that a greater number of 
democracies may actually lead to an increase in terrorist activity. Freeman suspects that 
democracies might more easily experience coercion by terrorists, might provide more 
permissive operating environments, and might be less effective at counterterrorism because 
of a willingness to maintain liberal norms and values.161 Overall, Freeman’s analysis does 
well to associate immediate and enabling Muslim grievances with a greater appeal for 
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global Salafi jihadist ideology, thus driving an increased interest in al-Qaeda; however, 
Freeman’s suggestion that democracies may invite terrorism has a sound counter argument. 
2. Target Democracy: Hard or Soft 
Max Abrahms finds many scholars of counterterror strategy advocating a theory 
that brutality pays in campaigns against terrorists.162 Such a mindset would seem to ensure 
success for authoritarian regimes unlikely to experience any blowback from heavy-handed 
counterterrorist tactics and leave democracies wanting a viable way to address their threats. 
Robert Pape and Walter Laqueur agree that democracies are too easily the subjects of 
coercion and make concessions when pressured by terrorists.163 Abrahms takes issue with 
these assertions, and through empirical analysis, he finds that “liberal countries are 
comparatively resistant to coercion—and hence make for inferior targets—because they 
are superior counterterrorists.”164 He makes this claim by revealing that suspected 
liabilities are actually assets in the counterterrorist battle.165 
Through a commitment to civil liberties during its counterterrorist response, 
explains Abrahms, the liberal state avoids making drastic repressive overreactions that 
characterize the reactions of more illiberal countries.166 In so doing, the liberal state 
preserves support from three key demographics: domestic publics, the international 
community, and moderates.167 Abrahms asserts that continuity in public and international 
support allows liberal regimes to execute long-term integrated plans motivated by 
minimizing cost in money, effort, and / or lives.168 However, the preservation of support 
from the moderate factions of aggressor populations is most crucial. Moderates represent 
the gray zone of opposing sides following a terrorist attack. Overreaction to terrorist attacks 
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using repressive measures serves to drive the moderates into the arms of welcoming 
extremists.169 When liberal states use a metered approach to counterterror tactics, they 
preserve the gray zone and likewise preserve a key asset in eliminating extremist 
ideology.170 
C. CONCLUSION 
The characterization of new terrorism can be debated, most effectively over the 
topics of its decentralized, transnational nature, its increasingly complex and effective use 
of social media, and its religious-based ideological motivations of a clash between 
civilizations. Pragmatically, a concerted debate over the label new or old is largely 
irrelevant, so long as the account of presently occurring terrorist trends is accurate. A more 
important conflict to recognize is the battle over margin populations fitting into the 
category of so called gray zone demographics and focus counterterrorism efforts on 
winning that ideological contest. Winning the sentiment of the gray zone should be a 
principal goal of liberal democratic states; however, democratic values may prove to be an 
impediment to progress in the short term. Muslim populations have grievances that must 
be addressed using local rules, or else the state risks alienating the people by imposing 
incompatible cultural changes. Also of primary importance is the role of liberal states in 
maintaining measured counterterrorist policies, so that key demographics supporting the 
counterterrorist effort remain willingly aligned with target states in the long term. 
Vera Zasulich’s attack in 1878 was a reaction to a social situation that had become 
intolerable. The mechanics of her violent behavior were not unlike attacks seen in France 
and across the West in the last six years, yet much is also different. Her attack was borne 
out of years of observing resident class struggle and was ignited by the insufferable actions 
of the local governor. The Russian grievances were transparent, and Zasulich’s eventual 
targeting was straightforward. Today, grievances, opposing groups, and terror targets are 
not so clear. The terrorism sweeping through France and the rest of the world has evolved 
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to its present and most dangerous form as global Islamist jihad. It is a leaderless, low-tech 
movement from the margins seeking to eliminate the gray zone—a significant group of 
undecided and impressionable observers—found in the global Muslim community. This 
characterization of the new threat rightly remains general in nature. The degree of 
leadership involved, the type and complexity of terror methods terrorists use, and even the 
defining limits of the gray zone and target populations are open to individual interpretation, 
yet also under an umbrella of religious ideology. The number of violent permutations 
possible within such an array of variables is endless and therefore presents a wholly 
different and wicked problem. 
Terrorist attacks erupting in France after 2012 are part of a new age of terrorism. 
As the theoretical context describes in this chapter, religiously inspired global jihadists are 
operating in a new environment and using new tactics and techniques. More troubling, they 
are operating under a unique premise for what constitutes achievement of their political 
goals. In the Western sense of the term, political goals are no longer the desired end state. 
The next chapter explores the premise of their quasipolitical goals as a part in the broader 
discussion of Muslims’ place in the society-state construct of France. 
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III. A TALE OF THREE CITIZENS 
France is the playing field in a three-sided contest between groups vying for 
survival of their identity. Many immigrant Muslims wish to retain the religious heritage 
and lifestyle of their home countries, while the broader French population, backed by its 
government, desires to keep its own historical cultural traditions, characterized by 
secularization. These two groups have faced pressure to encourage greater assimilation of 
the Muslim population in French communities, but there are significant barriers to making 
this a reality. Most significant of these factors is the unique church-state relationship 
codified under France’s secularization law, laïcité. The ensuing social tension creates 
opportunity for a third group, violent Islamists, to insert an extreme brand of religious 
ideology into an otherwise civil, albeit protracted, political debate between the French 
political establishment and immigrant French Muslims. These extremists carry the message 
of violent Salafism and mandate a completely different set of goals than their moderate 
coreligionists.  
Ingroup-outgroup affiliation has strong implications among these three actors by 
defining the actual and perceived narratives used by each group to vilify those with 
contesting viewpoints and defend their own positions. Conflating Salafi and moderate 
French Muslim political goals in the minds of nationalistic observers hardens non-Muslim 
sentiment against any concessions to Muslim assimilation. The resulting widespread 
rejection of Muslim political demands then becomes fertilizer for radical Salafi ideology 
to preach a problem-solution narrative pitting terrorism against the Western world. 
This chapter develops three megathemes supporting a rise of new terrorism in 
France. It shows that France’s Westernized, yet hypersecularized state structure, the 
difficulty of French Muslims in achieving political goals, and an exceptional level of 
assimilationist behavior by French Muslims have both fomented an identity crisis and made 
France a likely target for global jihadis. Since these three themes militate against Islamist 
goals, Islamist narratives readily use them as justification for violence. 
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Five sections trace the origins and manifestation of the weakened social conditions 
in France. The first section begins by exploring the nature of the Muslim identity in France 
and its likelihood to achieve communal solidarity. The second section details three entities 
that historically vie to define and harness that identity. The third section presents the 
institutional church-state patterns within France, beginning with a description of the 
challenging framework that the Muslim community must leverage for political engagement 
and continues by tracing a historical review of the road to laïcité. The fourth section 
enumerates three main French Muslim political goals that are at the center of heated 
political debate, and then it contrasts the goals and ideology of radical Islamists. The fifth 
and final section develops the interlocking narratives between identity groups and how 
France might present an exceptional environment for increased jihadist terrorism. 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF IDENTITY CONFLICT 
How Muslims view themselves and their association within a community of 
coreligionists is an important keystone in the present study of resurgent jihadist attacks, as 
it helps reveal how members of the Muslim community think and make decisions on a 
fundamental level. While the everyday Muslim citizen in France and radicalized jihadists 
shall not be considered interchangeable terms in this thesis, the groups are connected—
even amid differing theology—by religion. Therefore, well-crafted narratives develop fast 
in-roads that can draw individuals from one group identity to the other. It should not be 
surprising that religion is a fundamental factor in creating personal or communal identity. 
Not limited to Islam, religion “galvanizes and inspires” because it contains a “coherent set 
of rituals, behaviors and beliefs,” key ingredients to a ready-made identity.171 These 
observations are worthy of consideration not only regarding intrafaith relationships but also 
in relation to how successfully the Muslim community has engaged with the French 
government.  
The majority of Muslims in France hail from the Maghreb, the northwest African 
countries of Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria and a smaller percentage claiming Arab 
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origins in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.172 The preponderance of Africans is 
not surprising given the close geographic proximity to France and its history of Algerian 
and Tunisian colonialism. More revealing, however, is the lack of subscription to the idea 
of the Islamic umma, a concept that makes no provision for divides under the title of 
Muslim once in the Islamic community.173  
Oliver Roy studied distinctions in French Muslim groups in the early 1990s, a 
period following extensive political maneuvering by Muslim interest groups and rising 
tensions that preceded GIA terrorist attacks. He states that Islam did not transcend “ethnic, 
linguistic, [or] national divisions” in French society.174 In France, an ethnic Arab or African 
considers Islam as only part of his or her identity, placing ethnic origin—and in some cases, 
French nationalism—over religion.175 According to Roy, this breakdown in loyalties along 
ethnic divides results in “no overall authority” to run a community of Muslims.176 
Polls from 2006 support the idea that French Muslims maintain a much higher 
percentage of nonreligious self-identification than do their immigrant counterparts in other 
European countries. According to the Pew Research Center, “When asked whether they 
consider themselves as a national citizen first or as a Muslim first, French Muslims split 
relatively evenly (42% vs. 46%)”177 This is significant for two reasons. First, the survey 
asked for feelings on French national identity—vice a more common connection to some 
ethnic cultural heritage—essentially probing the connection with a fully European 
livelihood. That Muslims adopt this standpoint reveals a step beyond ethnic loyalties and 
a distinct desire to integrate along European lines. Second, the percentage of respondents 
identifying as French national citizens eclipsed the sentiment of its European neighbors. 
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Only 13 percent of German Muslims felt such inclination, while single digit percentages 
of British and Spanish Muslims responded as such.178 
The daily practice of Islam in French society is no more consistent than the ethnic 
make-up of the Muslim community, lending greater credence to a notion of fragile Muslim 
solidarity. Roy describes a split in the degree of religious piety exhibited by a strict “five 
cardinal precepts” version espoused by clerics and traditionalists on the one hand and the 
“minimal observance” model, which emphasizes cultural differences, on the other.179 Most 
young Muslims fall into the second category and have a “more ethnic than religious” 
identity.180 Roy also specifically cites oft-violent “young urban-zone beurs” as expressing 
their own subculture by combining popular culture norms with a superficial observance of 
Islam.181 He posits that by maintaining a loose association to the religion, they make a 
“gesture of refusal” to French secularists in support of Muslim political demands, vice any 
real attempt to make Islam a pronounced item of communal identity.182  
Muslim identity is such a complex deconstruction and reconstruction of ethnic, 
cultural, and religious identities (religion having the least influence) that a purposeful 
community was not possible, or desired, by the Muslim people. There was simply no 
demand signal in French society for such a distinction. The concept of fomenting a specific 
community identity is a demand signal from elsewhere with more strategic goals in mind. 
B. DIGGING FOR IDENTITY 
By the 1990s, three sociopolitical actors sought control of Muslim political 
mobility, yet each found difficulty reaching any desired end state.183 First are the elites of 
the Muslim community who sought the establishment of special interest groups able to 
leverage French politics. However, Roy found that there was little popular interest on the 
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part of Muslims in forming either ethnic or religious lobbies.184 Rather, he discovered, “the 
greater the degree of integration, the less assertiveness there [was] about ethnic origin.”185 
Additionally, these political elites generally appeared complicit with government 
interlocutors and represented themselves more than any other contrived political lobby.186  
The second group to vie for community influence was composed of fundamentalist 
Islamists wishing to sever the Muslim community from French society.187 These 
nonconformist stalwarts were not interested in political maneuvering, instead they 
advocated a front against any integration.188 Additionally, they envisioned enclaves within 
France where constitutional secularism did not apply and where space was available for 
Muslim communities to teach, learn, and live according to Koranic chapter and verse. This 
apolitical program found constituents mainly in the unsuccessful poor working class, the 
ones who had attempted participation in French society and failed, and who harbored 
feelings of guilt, hopelessness, and anti-Western sentiment as a result of their rejection.189 
The French government was the third group, and it had a vested interest in nurturing 
a defined Muslim political entity with which it could interact. Motivated by a desire to 
avoid the kind of social protest of the 1980s and terrorism that would plague France in the 
mid-1990s, the French state sought interaction with Muslim community leaders. 
Interestingly, France does not recognize ethnic groups; instead, it aspires to the melting pot 
model that “[boils] away the residues of cultural identity.”190 Religious communities, on 
the other hand, are recognized—as the Catholic Church has been for centuries with varying 
degrees of authority.191  
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The French Interior Ministry attempted engagement with Muslims through the 
establishment of the Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam en France (CORIF) in 1990.192 Due 
to a lack of homegrown leadership, it was “estimated [that] 95 percent of all Imams in 
France...come from abroad.”193 This organization’s explicit goal was to counter the 
fundamental Islamist message often asserted by “overseas sponsors” and “contribute to a 
formulation of doctrine appropriate to Islam in France.”194 The CORIF soon floundered, 
however, as its appointed representatives provided mostly “artificial” support to the 
Muslim community, members of which had been coopted into their positions.195 
Roy identifies a paradox in the approach of French government incorporation. 
CORIF program officials risked rebuilding ties along ethnic lines, since the group’s 
Muslim leaders, considered by the government to be religiously affiliated, instead 
identified on cultural, ethnic grounds. The French government also ran the risk of finding 
“itself in the untenable situation of having to express opinions on what was good Islam and 
what was bad.”196 The United Kingdom realized this quandary in 2005 following the 7/7 
transport bombings when it recruited theologians and imams to preach anti-jihadist 
messages to Muslim youth; however, the British government inadvertently sponsored some 
messages, surpassing its desired level of moderation.197  
C. THE CHURCH-STATE PATTERN 
The framework for political engagement available to French Muslims helps define 
the ability of the interest group to form representation and win political goals. Joel Fetzer 
and Christopher Soper undertook a comparative analysis of European state approaches to 
Muslim integration that gives us insight into the most influential political engagement 
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theories for framing the issue. They cite four focus areas: resource mobilization, political 
opportunity structure, political ideology, and historic church-state institutional patterns.198 
While the authors expand on the claim that church-state patterns are the most decisive when 
comparing the experiences between sovereign states, each of the four areas have 
implications affecting the discussion on solely France as well. 
1. Political Challenges 
Resource mobilization describes the relative power between opposing political 
parties and how much political influence they can muster in support of their causes. 
Resources entail “labor, materials, money... [as well as] communal unity, coherent 
organizational resources, and strategic placement of communal personnel in elite 
positions.”199 In concurrence with Roy, Fetzer and Soper cite several other analysts who 
believe the “existence of ethnic, religious, national, and linguistic divisions within the 
Muslim community acts as a barrier to their political mobilization in Western European 
nations.”200  
The uniquely centralized polity of France under a unitary system of government 
creates a challenging political opportunity structure for French Muslims. Unlike in 
federalized systems, a Muslim lobby must interact with the central government to have any 
comprehensive affect toward its political goals.201 With a demonstrated weakness in 
resource mobilization, French Muslims have been unable to reach the threshold of support 
required for competitive political engagement at a national level. 
French Muslims face the additional challenge of overcoming the political ideology 
“of integration rather than accommodation [in France].”202 A philosophy of absorbing 
immigrant groups into the French culture prevails over any desires for multiculturalism, 
                                                 
198 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 7.  
199 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 8.  
200 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 8,9.  
201 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 11–12.  
202 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 14.  
 50 
and these sentiments “prove resistant to change.”203 Much to the dismay of motivated 
Muslim activists, the role that religion should play in public life does not receive as much 
attention as ideas about citizenship, political incorporation, and liberal political values.204 
At the forefront of the debate over Muslim political demands is the role of laïcité 
in defining a place for religion in French society. Laïcité embodies the church-state 
institutional framework and therefore provides the most French-specific context for 
investigating problems of Muslim assimilation. The next section provides this context and 
paves the way for a detailed look at how the French Muslim political demands have fared 
within. 
2. The Road to Laïcité 
To examine the socio-political environment that French Muslims have experienced 
for the last 20 years, one must understand the long history of laïcité in becoming the 
dominant church-state framework in France. Within this framework, Islam is theoretically 
not an outlying target of disproportionate rejection by the French state. Indeed, religion has 
been under suspicion and sometimes violent attack by French secularists for over 200 
years, with Catholicism and other Christian sects as the primary targets.205 
a. De-Legitimizing Religion 
Until the end of the 18th century, the Catholic Church played puppeteer to the 
French system of government within the Holy Monarchy. However, following the French 
Revolution, the Church struggled to retain even a place, let alone influence, in French 
society. Revolutionaries seized Church property and systematically killed or deported 
Catholic priests.206 It was not until Napoleon Bonaparte signed the Concordat of 1801 with 
Pope Pius VII that religion recouped a margin of legitimacy to practice unencumbered, 
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even regaining mild subsidies from the state via salaried clergy.207 Later that century, as 
anti-clerical partisans gained influence in the French parliament, France passed the Ferry 
laws of 1882, which “effectively laïcized public education.”208 After this, clergy could no 
longer influence the content or administration of the school system, although schools were 
only open six days per week to allow students one day to attend separate religious studies, 
if desired.209 
b. The Separation Law 
Laïcité in its current context officially passed as the Separation Law on December 
9, 1905. While upholding previous markers of church-state division, it also eliminated the 
Napoleonic vestige of state sponsorship, either through salaries or by supplementing any 
other expense.210 Laïcité quickly became a polemical term, with strong anti-Christian and 
atheist tones, and it came to represent a symbol of triumph by the Republicans over 
historically Catholic dominance.211  
More recently, a debate proceeds over the proper reading of the Separation Law.212 
The debate establishes a political discourse segregating its proponents into camps of so-
called “strict” and “soft” interpreters of laïcité.213 Strict proponents call for the elimination 
of any religious activity from public space and mandating penalties for violators. Soft 
advocates take less issue with public expression of religion and generally support Muslim 
political goals, citing human rights and religious freedom. Professor of French history 
Robert Zaretsky considers laïcité to have “acquired so much mystique as to be practically 
an ideology.”214 He feels that a more straightforward reading of the law, devoid of political 
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maneuvering intent on defining French values, gives it a meaning more in line with its 
original purposes.215 Zaretsky cites excerpts from the law itself guaranteeing “freedom of 
conscience” and “the free exercise of worship” to emphasis its worthy liberal ideals; 
however, these quotes are more purposefully cherry picked from the full narrative, which 
tells a slightly different story.216 
Upon investigating the Separation Law further, one finds “Title V: Police of the 
Cults” replete with the kind of verbiage lending credence to strict laïcité supporters. Among 
the harsher dictates is “meetings for worship...remain placed under the surveillance of the 
authorities in the interest of public order” and “it is forbidden, in the future, to raise or affix 
any religious symbols or emblems on public monuments or in any public place 
whatsoever.”217 Article 35 of the Separation Law prohibits direct provocation of public 
authority by ministers through either speech or writing and prescribes penalties for such 
behavior.218 It is apparent that laïcité has antagonistic undertones toward religion of all 
kinds; yet, the time transpiring since the bloody 1789 Revolution has permitted Catholicism 
some operating space that Islam has not yet achieved. 
c. Effects of Secularization 
France stands out among other European countries in its lack of religious 
observance. The 1990 European Values Survey found that many French citizens 
proclaimed to not attend religious services or believe in God.219 The survey found 34 
percent of French respondents advocated “no religion,” 59 percent never went to church, 
and “only 57 percent claimed a belief in God.”220 These numbers and the national culture 
they represent worry many in the Muslim community. Pew Research polls from 2006 
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indicate that 72 percent of Muslims in France are at least somewhat concerned that Islam 
is experiencing a decline of influence among its faithful.221 Additionally, they feel that with 
no public venue supporting religious education, they must act at the family level to pass on 
Islamic values and traditions or risk that their progeny will cease to identify as Muslims.222 
As one might expect of any sovereign state, France has handled the question of 
religious rights on its own terms and according to its own history and heritage. Unlike the 
church-state separations in America, laïcité is the result of centuries-long distrust and 
conflict between the Catholic Church and the French Republican government.223 In its case, 
France spilled blood to separate church from state and spent centuries democratically 
working toward laïcité—that long-established framework and the mindset supporting it 
will not easily change.224 From this perspective, opposition to Muslim political demands is 
not a case of “Islamophobia” but simply the political culture of French government 
concerning any religion. In the next section, we see if this definition of laïcité applies 
uniformly across social groups and just how impartially Muslims have fared in pursuit of 
their political goals.  
D. MUSLIM POLITICAL GOALS 
Desire for Muslim political mobility in France stems from three uniformly accepted 
aims. They are goals free of radical thought or deed, and represent an appeal for the 
expression of a discreet public identity, which in some cases, is inconsistent with the Gallic 
political standard. Specifically, Muslims want moderate religious observance in state 
schools, the creation of Islamic schools, and the construction of more mosques. Two of the 
three objectives involve primary schooling, a fact warranting additional consideration 
when studying the underlying motives of Muslim demands. Emphasis on schooling not 
only indicates that the Islamic community values education, but also it specifically 
indicates the nature of the instruction. Discernment over the content of foundational 
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messages is a strong indicator that a community is concerned about the values, beliefs, and 
practices that transfer to the student generation. In short, it is evidence of strong desires of 
the Muslim community to provide a well-vetted, established identity to future generations. 
Radical Islamists comprise another Muslim group competing for influence in 
France; however, their political goals share no commonality with the majority of civic-
minded French Muslims. Their goals espouse violence to attain moral and legal superiority 
while subjugating Western values. However, the ostensible supremacy of Islamist ideology 
is rooted in extremely traditional, Salafist interpretations of Islam, making religion a 
common ground and potential gateway for mobilizing support from the common French 
Muslim populace. 
1. Immigrants to France 
The first major political goal is to proliferate religious activities in state schools.225 
This desire for overt religious practice came to a head in 1989 during the “Scarf Affair,” 
and this desire persists to the present day.226 Muslim girls wishing to wear the hijab as a 
symbol of traditional female Islamic custom faced expulsion if they wore the headdress 
while at school. While the Conseil d’État227 eventually ruled in favor of allowing practices 
like the wearing of the hijab, it also warned against “ostentatious symbols” that could be 
seen as discriminating or proselytizing.228 Many considered the guidance vague and 
individual school administrators generally decided the fate of their student bodies without 
further imposition from the French government.229  
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Powerful teachers’ unions like the Syndicat National des Enseignements de Second 
degré advocate strict laïcité in regards to the hijab, under the premise that any concession 
could act as a “Trojan horse for other things,” according to its former National Secretary, 
Francis Berguin.230 Strict advocates anticipate additional slippery slope conflicts, such as 
holding religious education as a formal subject; no testing during Ramadan; abstention 
from music, art, biology and sex education classes; requesting halal meat; and declining 
co-ed swimming or overnight field trips.231 
The French government revisited its position on headscarves in 2004 and finally 
passed a full-fledged ban.232 French Muslim students felt targeted, which only reinforced 
their desire for religious autonomy. One defiant young girl remarked, “When I come out 
[of school,] I can’t wait to put my veil back on. It was always important, but now even 
more so.”233 The government ban created potentially counterproductive effects given the 
remonstrative response in some school age girls. This behavior may fit well into Roy’s 
description of “gestures of refusal” by French Muslim youth. A law intended to secure 
secularization might have only deepened young Muslims’ fondness for religious 
identification.234 
The second desire of French Muslims writ large is to obtain state funding for the 
creation of Islamic schools. While the state does not subsidize private clerical salaries and 
other costs based in faith only, it does contribute to church based educational organizations 
that meet a set of predetermined criteria. The French state stipulates that organizations must 
have at least a five year term of successful service, well-qualified teachers, large number 
of students, and clean facilities; that the course of instruction closely follows that of public 
curricula; and that religious studies are optional to all students regardless of religious 
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background.235 Christian and Jewish schools have operated for decades under this 
construct.236 The lack of a representative body from the Muslim community to negotiate 
over these stipulations has left some or all of the preconditions unmet during the admittedly 
few attempts at founding Islamic schools.237 As a result, there is the impression of a double 
standard with regard to enabling non-Muslim schools while denying the proposals of 
Muslims. 
The third ubiquitous political goal for the Muslim community in France is to build 
more mosques. The French state supported Muslim worship as far back as 1926, when it 
presented the massive Paris Grand Mosque, a splendorous campus capable of hosting up 
to 5000 devotees, as a gift for the service of French colonial troops that fought for France 
in World War I.238 Since post-colonial immigration, however, French Muslims have found 
difficulty raising domestic resources to  construct Islamic houses of worship. The Gran 
Mosquée de Lyon is a rare example of successful incorporation. Despite protests from the 
Nationalist Front, a coalition of French Muslim leadership, with support from Lyon mayor 
Michel Noir, built the Mosque in 1994 with significant foreign financial support and 
political maneuvering.239 It was widely accepted by the surrounding community once in 
operation. However, greater issues arise in smaller localities were Muslim mobilization in 
support of Mosques meets local government personalities. In one extreme case, the Mayor 
of Charivieu, Gerard Dezempte, blatantly ignored or declined building permits, and rumors 
persist concerning his involvement in the bulldozing of a makeshift prayer house in 
1989.240 Such actions incite outrage and perpetuate a feeling of distrust within the Muslim 
community toward domestic officials, yet Muslims’ lack of a coherent and powerful lobby 
                                                 
235 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 85.  
236 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 85.  
237 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 85.  
238 Shafik Mandhai, “French Muslims Despondent after Champs Elysees Attack,” Al Jeazeera, April 
21, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/french-muslims-paris-champs-elysees-attack-
170421191712277.html.  
239 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 87–88.  
240 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 88–89.  
 57 
limits their ability to seek recourse—a necessity for achieving results in the 
hypercentralized French government system. 
Montpellier Mayor Georges Freche took a positive approach to fulfilling Muslim 
desires and helped fund a “multipurpose auditorium,” which could be leased to prospective 
congregations.241 The project received a lukewarm reception by Muslim citizens, however, 
as it created the same issues as CORIF doctrinal formulations and the post-transit bombing 
message campaign of the United Kingdom in 2005. When the French state takes anything 
resembling a normative stance on the practice of Islam, the Muslim community is likely to 
reject it. 
Both French Muslims and the French government face challenges with respect to 
meeting the other’s political demands. On one hand, the Muslim community seeks to retain 
elements of its heritage that the historical French church-state framework cannot readily 
accept. On the other hand, many within the French government perceive the Muslim 
community as a minority group with little representation trying to usurp fundamental 
principles of French society. However, even in the face of GIA terrorism through the mid-
1990s, the French Muslim population has worked in a relatively steadfast and civic manner 
against a governmental and societal establishment with deep-seated animosity for its 
political goals. The political motivations and behavior of the average French Muslim 
contrasts starkly with those of radical Islamists, manifested in the movement of global 
Salafi jihadists. The next section describes the difference in Muslim groups and how the 
extremist mindset brings a fresh narrative of civilizational and identity conflict to the 
forefront. 
2. Radical Islamists  
It is necessary to distinguish between Islamists and the majority of French Muslims 
to describe the forces sustaining the current wave of radicalization and terrorism. Islamists 
are those Muslims who desire full politicization of the Islamic religion. They are opposed 
to the idea of secular government and desire to establish a state that receives direction from 
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the Koran and the Hadiths—teachings of the Islamic prophet Mohammed. Contrary to the 
conventional Western paradigm, government in such an Islamic state is concerned more 
with the “fate of souls” than the social reforms, economic growth, or liberalization, which 
are primal political goals in Western culture.242 This has alarmed nationalist minded 
French. National Front politician, Serge Laroze remarked, “The problem with Islam is that 
it isn’t just a religion, but a civil code, a political constitution, a moral law.”243 Like his 
right-wing compatriots, Laroze suspects that for those reasons, France and Europe were on 
a “collision course with Islam.”244 
Professor of anthropology, Anna Simons believes that at the core of Islamism there 
“is a religious and divinely mandated template as old as the Koran itself.”245 Supporting 
the veracity of civilizational differences between the Muslim world and the West, she 
presents two distinctions that evoke a contest over moral superiority.246 First, Islam 
traditionally espouses “communal solidarities...that take precedence over the primacy of 
individuals.”247 Traditionalist Muslim lifestyle emphasizes community and collective 
responsibilities and obligations, based on divine instruction, which seems domineering and 
even invasive from a Western perspective.248 These values fall in direct opposition to 
Western liberal values and even more so of capitalism. France part of the West, wherein 
the individual is the primary unit of political accountability and, to an increasing extent, 
moral accountability.249 
Second, Western society cannot accept “domination by a single denomination.”250 
This follows closely with the views of liberalism, whereby individuals can decide for 
themselves what to believe and practice from a theological standpoint. Western political 
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systems do not discriminate with respect to religion by placing the tenets and laws of one 
faith above another. In France, the rule of law is historically rooted in people’s ability to 
deliberate what is best for society as adaptations and additions to the law are required. The 
final clearinghouse for constructing that moral standard is with humankind, specifically a 
political elite elected from the populace. All of this runs counter to fundamental 
interpretations of Islam. Islamists doctrinally connect the primacy of Islam—as directed by 
Allah and Mohammed alone—to state governance and the rules of communal life. In 
Islam’s doctrinal form, Muslims have no role in deciding the standards by which they live 
as their religion dictates these fundamentals. Islamists have fixed their narrative toward 
maintaining this dominate politico-religious identity. 
The result of these irreconcilable differences is the perception on both sides of a 
contest for moral superiority. It is the most basal issue and in Simons’s evaluation, one that 
defines the struggle as a religious war.251 Arguments against civilizational differences fall 
short by considering the idea of “religious war” in a very narrow context, which eliminates 
it from consideration as a contributory, much less causal, factor of global Islamist jihad. 
The jihadist religious battle wages not solely to destroy populations or take territory, but 
more importantly, to establish preeminence in the construct of a moral worldview—the 
religion of Islamic law in governing the East over the religion of secular lawgiving on the 
side of Western civilization. 
E. THE HUMAN NARRATIVE 
Simons’s anthropological model is very useful in categorizing the three groups 
vying for identity in France because it allows quick identification of their respective core 
narratives. In its most generic form, the model consists of outsiders, nativists, and 
accommodationists. Outsiders are any group that imposes change on a preexisting group 
maintaining its own culture and beliefs within set boundaries. Accommodationists 
welcome the change, or at the very least, do not resist it, while nativists comprise the group 
that reacts to accommodationist behavior because of its perceived threat to the integrity of 
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the group.252 The nativist group loathes the resulting split, or factionalization, between 
previously homogeneous groups of nativists and accommodationists as a turning point 
toward existential peril. This anthropological framework sets up two distinct fields of 
actors in France relative to assimilating Muslims: one from the perspective of the French 
political debate and one from the perspective of the radical jihadists.  
1. Twin Triads 
From the French perspective, Muslims are the outsiders. It is important to 
understand that a Gallic viewpoint can easily conflate radical and moderate Muslims in this 
category. This “outsider” Muslim group has encountered a “nativist” adversary in the form 
of xenophobic, nationalist political parties, and to a large degree, the public education 
establishment.253 Accommodation to French Muslim political demands generally comes 
from multiculturalist circles, as particularly evident during the headscarf debate. Nativist 
French thinking is based on the idea that France may be experiencing an attack on the 
nature of the republic itself, an identity they feel has been long established by native 
Europeans of a largely Christian, often atheist, yet squarely secular persuasion. The French 
government’s narrative to Muslims is that they must assimilate to the French culture if they 
want to live in France. The Muslim community’s resistance to secularization has spurred 
the notion in political circles of whether Muslims are capable of assimilating into French 
society at all. The French nationalist hardline approach permits a narrative whereby radical 
Islamists can preach an “us-versus-them” message to struggling Muslims and paints the 
Gallic French opposition as a problem only Islamist terrorism can solve.  
From the terrorist perspective, all Western civilizations are outsiders. Director of 
the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project at Brookings Institute, Kemal 
Kirisci believes that “Salafism is at war with the whole of the world” and that everyone but 
Salafi loyalists are either trying to destroy Islam or simply allowing its destruction to 
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occur.254 From this viewpoint, Islamists are the nativist group, and moderate Muslims—as 
found in France—are the accommodationists. Salafist devotees espouse the need to protect 
what they consider the “true” Islam from the bastardization of Western influence—an 
attempt at cultural change evident in the French political discourse with Muslim groups. In 
the eyes of Salafists, apostate Muslims are worse than their Western influencers, since they 
actively factionalize the Muslim umma, destroying the paramount goal of maintaining the 
moral superiority and coherence of the “true” Muslim identity.255 
2. French Exceptionalism 
During the mid-2000s, French Muslims exhibited a wide breadth of Westernized 
sentiment that Islamist groups could easily interpret as accommodationist behavior and that 
supports an extremist viewpoint of communal factionalization. Data collected by the Pew 
Research Center in 2006 provides a clear picture of how differently Muslims in France 
think about themselves and their associations in French society when compared to their 
contemporaries in other parts of the world. The data is promising for hopes of greater 
Muslim integration in France, but it also serves to emphasize how most French Muslims 
dissociate with Islamist ideology. This chapter has touched on French Muslims’ relatively 
high rate of perceiving themselves as national citizens first, a clear outlier among other 
European states and a strong irritant to Islamists; yet, there are three additional telltales 
within the polling data that show exceptional sentiments among French Muslims. 
French Muslims hold a very favorable view of Christians and Jews. A full 91 
percent of respondents in the 2006 Pew survey viewed Christians favorably, even besting 
the sentiments of both the United States and French public.256 Most surprising may be the 
response from 71 percent of French Muslims, who held favorable views of Jews. Not only 
does this nearly equal the sentiment of indigenous Europeans and Americans, but also it is 
on average 40 percent higher than Muslims of surrounding European countries. In 
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comparison, the positive feeling for Jews in predominately Muslim lands generally falls to 
single digit percentages. 
The number of Muslims actively practicing Islam in France at the time of the Pew 
survey was very low, hinting at disassociation with their Islamic heritage. According to 
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, an immigration specialist and researcher at the Center for 
International Studies and Research in Paris, only 10 percent of Muslims in France are 
actively practicing their faith.257 She notes that this is nearly identical to the number of self-
proclaimed practicing Catholics.  
Finally, another divergence in the data occurred when French Muslims responded 
to whether they would rather be distinct from mainstream French society or adopt French 
customs. Four out of five Muslims polled chose assimilation over separation.258 In 
comparison, Muslims in Germany, Spain, and Britain divided somewhat evenly on the 
issue or leaned toward remaining distinct from their adopted nationalities. 
Interpretation of the Pew Research data shows potentially accommodationist 
behavior in the French Muslim community. In four key areas—favorable views of other 
religions, low turnout of Islamic devotees, self-perception as a French citizen, and a high 
preference for assimilation—French Muslim sentiments are not only anomalous when 
compared to Muslims of other European countries, but they also fit the description of an 
accommodationist response to Westernization in the eyes of a nativist Islamist movement. 
In the form of closer ties with Western politics and culture, apostate behavior builds strong 
motivation for jihadists to “rescue” the French arm of the Islamic umma from disintegrating 
influences in France. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Examining the sociopolitical relations of Muslims in France reveals that a three-
sided identity conflict is underway between integrating Muslim citizens, the Gallic French 
population, and radical-minded Islamists. This conflict arises because each group perceives 
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the others as an existential threat. Well before the rapid increase in terrorist attacks 
beginning in 2012, there was social tension between immigrant Muslims and the native 
French. This social discord maintained a gateway for Islamist narratives to resound within 
the discourse of French Muslim sociopolitical maneuvering. It also likely has provided the 
foundation for the latest wave of decentralized jihadist terrorists to find both support and 
targets for their cause. 
French Muslims have notable difficulty forming an effective political body able to 
pursue their communal goals. Overall, the record of Muslim political mobilization since 
the 1990s shows a trend of weak solidarity as an Islamic group, one that prefers ethnic 
associations before identifying together under Islam. Despite the inability of a coherent 
Muslim lobby to form, pockets of potential leadership have tried to shape the French 
Muslim community—sometimes toward and other times away from more thorough French 
integration. In either case, it is clear that Muslims will not entertain any normative 
influence by non-Muslims in their practice of Islam. These issues of political stalemate 
create an environment wherein French Muslims have lasting controversy with their 
government and compatriots.  
Laïcité is the church-state framework that emboldens the Gallic French standpoint 
behind strict secularism, and in the eyes of French nationalists, it is a tenet of liberal democracy 
under attack by Muslim political demands. The nature of the state disadvantages French 
Muslims at nearly every turn in their efforts for political engagement. In addition to their weak 
potential for mobilization, French Muslims are also hampered by the uniquely centralized 
French system and its ideology against multiculturalism. However, the Secularization Law of 
1905 is the strongest hurdle to overcome, both legally and ideologically. Laïcité represents a 
centuries-long struggle to form a republic free from overzealous religious influence. After more 
than two centuries spent curbing the role of religion in French society, France stands out among 
its European neighbors by its minimal participation in religious activity or beliefs. The 
imposition of this secular worldview is highly unpalatable to immigrant Muslims and provides 
fuel to morally based Islamist narratives. 
The communal self-image and political goals of majority French Muslims are vastly 
different from those of Islamists, yet they have a fundamental likeness in religion. While 
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the greater Muslim community seeks increased concession toward religion in schools and 
expansion of mosques into French communities, Islamists desire a complete political 
takeover of apostate and infidel governments with a sharia based Islamic society. 
Individual claims for moral superiority substantiate anthropological analysis that indicates 
that there may be incompatible differences between Islam and Western society. That is not 
to say that the differences are irreconcilable; however, one side or the other will need to 
make concessions for settlement to occur. In the face of making concessions to non-Muslim 
state actors over the practice of Islam, some Muslims could encounter a tough choice 
between Western democracy and radical Islamism as the most palatable and effective way 
to achieve their essential goals. 
Anthropology assists in building narratives between the three identity groups by 
categorizing the communities according to how each fundamentally sees the others. 
Outsider, nativist and accommodationist roles exist in France via two separate but 
synchronous frameworks. In addition to the more obvious outsider-nativist conflict, there 
is nativist-accommodationist antagonism between Islamists and moderate French Muslims 
that has exceptional relevance in France. Polling data shows that French Muslims have a 
much more liberal and Western mindset than other European Muslims. To radical 
Islamists, these trends prove factionalizing behavior on the part of French Muslims to a 
global Islamic community and are deserving of violent corrective action. 
By the end of the 2000s, new terrorism found France an easy target in three ways. 
Primarily, France represents a fully Western democratic state espousing a highly secular 
public society. Additionally, French law and popular Gallic culture give Muslims a very 
difficult time in their efforts to maintain some Islamic heritage and communal lifestyle. 
Finally, many Muslim immigrants have accepted Western ways and adopted liberal 
mindsets at a rate well above the norm of any other European or predominately Islamic 
nation. These three factors are antithetical to the Islamist theology driving new terrorism, 
and Islamists easily concoct extremist narratives along those lines. The violent narratives 
do not need to move large numbers to action. A small, marginal, decentralized few, who 




This thesis has sought explanations for why France, with its exemplary system of 
counterterrorism and 15-year record of public safety, experienced a sharp resurgence in 
jihadist terror attacks beginning in 2012 and escalating violently in the ensuing years. 
Although the French state had unresolved social tensions with its Muslim population in the 
years preceding a return of jihadist terrorism, these African and Middle Eastern minorities 
held significantly more Westernized views than comparable nations’ immigrant 
demographic, and many French Muslims posed limited objection to France’s “citizen first, 
citizen only” cultural identity. It seems wholly illogical that domestic violence would arise 
because of grievances over assimilation, particularly when a marginal Muslim political 
base spent years fighting for a foothold in politics, intent to prove the Muslim community 
a full-fledged member of French society, vice a shadowy threat. Any pragmatic 
examination of a planned terrorist campaign in France would show its violence to have 
extremely negative effects to longstanding Muslim goals in the Hexagon—realized by the 
hypernationalist response of a large sector in the French population, heavy-handed 
counterterrorist crackdowns, and an evolution in state policy toward restrictive measures, 
vice liberalization. Therefore, the question remains, why was France so suddenly the target 
for jihadist attacks? 
It was important to first understand the details of this new threat. Examining 
France’s experience gives us the opportunity to develop the who, what, why, and how of a 
threat clearly claiming offshore origins. The research naturally progresses to finding 
vectors that made France a target for this specific threat. A review of the counterterrorist 
organizational culture frames a part of the context in which the attacks began; however, 
primarily a deeper look at the disposition of the Muslim population and its relationship to 
the French state reveals the seedbed for an existential identity conflict that Islamists used 
to motivate violence on the French homefront. 
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A. COUNTERTERRORIST CULTURE 
France did not always have an exemplary system of counterterrorism; rather, it 
developed the present institutional and organizational culture through years of trial and 
error and periods of violent unrest. Prior to an unacceptable rise in radical Islamist activity 
in the 1980s and 90s, the French political leadership was content to form a baseless détente 
with terrorists inside of France. The loss of domestic security and resultant public outcry 
resulting from CSPPA and GIA terrorism gave rise to the judiciary centric system of 
legislative magistrates as France’s modern counterterrorist framework. The arrangement 
of intelligence gathering and law enforcement activities under the purview of judges—
capable of powerful influence in local prosecution—provided a major course correction to 
France’s domestic security environment. However, the system was not perfect. Legislative 
magistrates entered the security scene amid a host of agencies that soon vied for relevancy 
under the broad authority of the terrorist courts. Communication and coordination between 
agencies suffered in the absence of a strong institutional command structure. Endemic 
inefficiency was not the only shortfall; infighting between law enforcement and 
intelligence branches became common as each sought to coopt the mission sets of the other 
by either magisterial request or approval. Finally, the French counterterrorist system was 
well versed and focused on leveraging specifically human elements. Operatives maintained 
community contacts and kept a steady pulse of activities in the known hotspots; however, 
the agencies as a whole did not leverage broad-scale, automated intelligence gathering, as 
became the norm in other Western countries. 
Attacks by the GIA during the mid-1990s tempered the French magisterial 
counterterror system; its real-world operations provided the system a legacy of success 
against well-organized terrorist groups and cells. At the same time, Internet communication 
was in its infancy, and social media had yet to turbo charge the effects of globalization. In 
short, French counterterrorism efforts focused on fighting the second, dwindling wave of 
global jihadism, and it did not anticipate the results of jihadist ideologues combining an 
authoritative message of Salafism with an organized information and social media 
campaign. Abstention from the global war on terror, which seemed to have instigated 
terrorist retribution on France’s participating European neighbors, gave French officials an 
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unfounded sense of safety from jihadists. Primarily, France lacked an understanding of 
how the jihadist threat was already changing. The jihadist international days of mounting 
organized attacks against the “far enemy” were over. Nearly coinciding with the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, sects of ultraviolent Sunni Muslims began a revolutionary plan 
for building their own nation intent on expansion. The success of ISIS in particular lent 
legitimacy and authority to a messaging campaign designed to motivate a global 
movement. Hierarchical cells and groups suddenly represented only a part of the jihadist 
problem, but it was the only part to which the French counterterrorist system had adapted 
well. 
B. NEW TERRORISM 
Today’s jihadist threat is focused on winning the sentiment of the gray zone Muslim 
population by advocating that it joins a decentralized, transnational movement. Skilled 
ideologues and Islamist stalwarts recruit this demographic with an us-versus-them 
civilizational conflict narrative disseminated through social media channels worldwide. 
The narrative aims to evoke strong theological and emotional bases among potential 
Islamists, but the attacks themselves have different aims. Violence against the West and 
any party considered to accommodate its worldview is meant to instigate an overreaction 
that is subsequently releveraged into the jihadist us versus them narrative. The prophesy is 
self-fulfilling. For a young, disenfranchised, or hopeless Muslim population, the narrative 
is not only believable, but more importantly, it provides a legitimate and even divine 
purpose. 
France has been the target of a new brand of jihadist terrorism; the tragic result of 
adaptations made to a decades old narrative pitting East versus West. In its newest form, it 
is truly transnational and empowers independent action from a wide swath of unhappy, 
angry, disenfranchised, or disillusioned supporters. Pious adherence and knowledge of 
Islam is not a prerequisite for this disparaged group. In fact, prospective radicals’ limited 
exposure to mainstream Islam worked in the favor of Islamist calls for support. In one 
sense, individuals interested by the jihadist narrative had no strong reference for how 
Islamists had twisted the message away from moderate Islam. Individuals steeped in the 
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mainstream message of Islam likely provide Islamists with a harder target than those with 
a weaker spiritual base. Additionally, Islamist ideologues tout the ability for non-practicing 
Muslims, who had fallen away from the faith, to regain favor and eternal reward through 
jihadist terrorism. In any case, arguments that suppose the new terrorists lack motivation 
from religion do not hold up to the dynamics of their recruitment. To the surprise of many 
media outlets reporting on the habits of ISIS recruits, it may even be appropriate that new 
jihadists own a copy of “Islam for Dummies.”259 
C. SOCIETY-STATE 
The birth of third and fourth wave global jihad in the 2000s introduced Salafist 
jihadist intentions to the French homefront and set the conditions for a three-sided identity 
conflict in France. Disagreements between the Muslim population and the French state 
were not new in the early 21st century, as a two-sided conflict was already common in the 
political sphere. However, the entry of new terrorism into the status quo of French political 
discourse unsettled everyone’s expectations in the wake of its renewed violence. 
French Muslims experienced historical difficulty winning their political goals for 
several reasons. Their lack of solidarity or motivation to mobilize on a religious basis was 
weak, as most communities preferred cultural, ethnic associations. The hypercentralized 
nature of the French political system also presented a barrier to progress for French 
Muslims, as the threshold for entry into national level politics was too high for the Muslim 
base’s weak record of mobilization. Additionally, French Muslims faced the challenging 
mandate of integration, vice accommodation, that the Gallic political philosophy espouses. 
However, French Muslims’ greatest political obstacle has certainly been laïcité, the 
overarching concept of national secularism codified into French law in 1905. Laïcité is an 
element of French society long established by a distrust of religious prominence in France 
and presents a barrier for any religion to assert its presence in the public domain, no matter 
how moderate the requests. 
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The problem of satisfying French Muslim political demands became has become 
exponentially more complicated with the introduction of global Salafism. The jihadist 
narrative and its quasipolitical goal of world domination caused sufficient confusion within 
an otherwise complicated debate between French Muslims and their state. The intentions 
and public narratives of French Muslims conflate with those of Islamist stalwarts and are 
therefore misunderstood by the general public and categorized as overly dangerous to the 
preexisting French identity protected by laïcité. From an anthropological standpoint, each 
side takes up one of three natural positions as an outsider, nativist, or accommodationist. 
In each case, nativists and outsiders compete for the survival of their group identity, and, 
in France, this is exactly the nature of the struggle. 
The anthropological framework laid over the situation in France reveals an 
exceptional quality of the French Muslim community. French Muslims show a remarkable 
degree of accommodation to Western thinking and the way of life in Western countries. 
Their adapted mindsets are a quantum change from the sentiments found in their cultural 
homelands and are significantly more accommodating than even their closest European 
Muslim neighbors. The ideological standpoint of French Muslims makes them ideal targets 
of global Salafi jihad. Jihadist doctrine stipulates that apostate Muslims, or kuffar, present 
the greatest threat to Islam as it disintegrates Islamic cohesion from the inside. As a result, 
ripe targets abound in France, whether infidel Gallic French or kuffar French Muslims.  
Islamist ideologues also readily use the history of failed political engagement 
between the French Muslim community and its Western government to prove the 
subjugation of Islam. They easily portray this subjugation as the reason for Muslim 
socioeconomic suffering, loss of purpose, and loss of identity. Many second and third 
generation Muslim youth feel subjugated in French society and experience a loss of true 
belonging to either the heritage of their parents or the Western culture of contemporary 
French society. Islamist narratives describe French society as the reason for their loss and 
jihad as the way to regain true identity and purpose. 
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D. EXPLANATIONS TESTED 
Of my three hypotheses, none proved to be an entirely accurate explanation, but 
each shows some applicability into the overall phenomenon of recurrent terrorist attacks in 
France. First, a tipping point in socioeconomic grievances did not necessarily occur. At 
least in the context of historical “class struggle,” there was no consolidated sentiment for 
popular revolution that boiled over into violence. The closest French society came to such 
upheaval was during the moderate Muslim uprising in the summer of 2005; but those riots 
were still extremely localized and subsided as quickly as they began. It may be more 
accurate to describe a perfect storm of three contributing factors rather than a tipping point 
in just one. First, the methods of jihadists evolved in this period from recruiting 
mujahedeen to inspiring a movement. Second, the information revolution hit its full stride 
in the mid-2000s, and this provided a venue for jihadist narratives on television and 
computer screens worldwide. Third, young Muslims of second generation heritage came 
into adulthood and began feeling a lack of identity within French society. While not a 
socioeconomic tipping point, this confluence of factors effectively accelerated the jihadist 
threat beyond what French counterterrorist agencies were prepared to handle. 
Second, any perceived Muslim resistance to integration does not seem to have 
direct correlation to jihadist violence. Primarily, jihadists did not attack in an attempt to 
win concession by the state to political demands. Additionally, evidence shows that French 
Muslims actually have an overtly Western outlook on life in France, contrasting with the 
goals of violent Islamism. Although French Muslims still desire more acceptance of their 
culture, they do not take a diametrically oppositional standpoint to the French state, as do 
radical Islamists.  
Third, the idea that the French state was unable to engage the threat politically may 
be slightly inaccurate, as this requires a bit of nuanced dissection. It is true that the West 
cannot reason with hardcore Salafi ideologues, since their quasipolitical goal is the 
destruction of everyone unwilling to accept their worldview. Additionally, by design, new 
terrorism is decentralized on a global scale, which degrades the ability for target states to 
locate leaders and eliminate or coerce groups. However, after slicing the problem back to 
an investigation of the mindset of young French “foot soldiers” recruited to conduct jihad, 
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we may find a more malleable party with which to negotiate. In this sense of the term, 
political negotiation, is achievable, but it requires a wholly different approach from state 
governments, who currently address the problem once already a hostage of jihadism. 
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
These policy recommendations arise from my examination of why France 
experienced a return of terrorism in 2012, so the reaction of the French state after that date 
has not been the explicit focus of this research. However, France has put extraordinary 
effort into aggressive counterterrorism policy since November 2015. In October 2017, 
France voted previously temporary emergency powers into permanent law.260 As the 
results of these changes begin to reflect in the stability of France’s current security 
environment, it may be wise for policy makers to consider the adaptations recommended 
here. I attempted to delineate recommendations for the state and for its counterterrorist 
agencies separately; however, the recommendations inevitably applied to both entities and 
are therefore consolidated in discussion. 
First, I first echo a sentiment reiterated throughout the scholarship on terrorism. 
Like any other democratic state, France must take a metered approach to its counterterror 
response so as to avoid playing into the narrative of jihadist ideologues. Additionally, the 
state must be careful to avoid violating the rights and sensitivities of the law-abiding public, 
lest it appear as an aggressor to potential gray zone demographics. Losing the gray zone 
not only reduces the capacity of the state, but it also increases the capacity of Islamists 
competing for any edge in the identity contest. France may have difficulty maintaining the 
balance between domestic security and personal liberty considering its secular history, 
which sets a precedent for antagonism over religious-based issues. Concerted efforts by 
both intelligence and law enforcement to regain trust amid local communities is key. 
While the counterterrorism establishment must regain the human dimension of its 
investigative toolkit, it must also add the technological advantage of automated information 
gathering that served other Western states well over the preceding decade. Since so much 
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of what occurs prior to a terrorist attack now transpires via the Internet and social media, 
French counterterrorist agencies would be remiss to leave this robust digital information 
capability undeveloped. Interface with other developed countries in this regard could offset 
the transnational advantages of new terrorism and lead investigators even further back up 
the trail of radicalizing Islamists. 
Adaptations in the information sphere should apply to state level activities with 
overarching influence over the public’s understanding of the security environment. 
Information campaigns should not simply target the Muslim population with messages of 
deradicalization. They must also target each group of the anthropological triad. Debunking 
the complex narratives between outsiders, nativists, and accommodationists would lead to 
common understanding and a clearer picture of reality. Placing this tool in the hands (or 
minds) of the average citizen leverages the power of multitudes. In this context, the state 
is no longer responsible for deradicalizing every potential intransigent; instead, individuals 
at the community level become advocates for the state and contributors to domestic 
security. 
Finally, counterterrorist agencies must reorganize under a higher echelon of 
leadership. France has many talented and experienced security organizations that do not 
require extensive overhaul; however, the system has operated with untapped synergy 
because of stove-piped information gathering and an unhealthy competition for relevancy. 
Any additional layers of leadership should concentrate on ensuring unencumbered 
information sharing and the specific delegation of responsibilities among the subordinate 
security agencies. However, new leadership must be careful not to hamper the benefits 
realized through the informal methods of investigative magistrates. 
F. FUTURE RESEARCH 
From a specifically French standpoint, the idea that the Hexagon may be a more 
desirable target for jihadists because of its accommodationist tendencies with the Western 
world needs additional empirical evidence. If actual jihadist sentiments or specific 
direction from Islamist ideologues support the theoretical findings, the implications for 
other states would become clearer. Specific states, even communities, exhibiting similar 
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accommodationist tendencies could use that information to increase their vigilance for 
potential targeting.  
Any investigation of terrorism is most effectual by digging as deeply as possible 
into its root causes. Unfortunately, researchers would inevitably find that additional 
digging only reveals that at some point the terrorist makes a personal decision to engage in 
aggression and violence over any other course of action. Many factors go into that very 
personalized decision. As Bruce Hoffman noted in his final remarks during a Washington 
Institute Forum on lone wolf terror, simply “look into the soul of a person, and you’ll know 
if he’s going to become a terrorist.”261 He then rhetorically asks, “How do we counter the 
message that violence is good—that it feels good to exact revenge?” Short of the capability 
to read minds or souls, terrorism scholars must be able to determine what factors influence 
a potential terrorist to cross the threshold and decide for violence. They must also place 
effort toward determining what factors stop a potential terrorist from radicalizing. 
Emphasizing the second, positive half of this equation equips counterterrorist agencies with 
the knowledge to develop information campaigns with actionable core concepts expressed 
in the local language. Instead of simply enumerating a list of pathways to violence, a clearer 
road back to moderation empowers agencies and communities with something to do in the 
fight against tomorrow’s terrorists. 
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